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This is one chapter from the book, Judicial Independence: Economic Theory and 
Japanese Empirics, that Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen are writing.  In preceding chapters 
we explain the institutions   of  modern Japan’s judiciary and use regression analysis to test 
whether judges who rule in ways the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) disliked were 
penalized in their careers.  We find that they were for some kinds of cases—involving such 
things as the constitutionality of the military, injunctions against the national (but not local) 
government,  reapportionment, and electioneering laws. They were not penalized for other kinds 
of cases—tax and criminal cases. Those results are drawn from our earlier published papers, 
reorganized and synthesized for the present book.  
 
    This chapter does not draw on our published work.  It  asks why the degree and type of  
independence of judges in modern Japan is different from that of other civil servants.  In 
particular, we compare judges in modern Japan, pre-war Japan, and the United States; and we 
compare judges with other kinds of public employees, asking why they are not elected and why 
they are not directly under the control of politicians.  
 
This chapter can be found at Http://Php.Indiana.edu/~erasmuse/papers/jbook/07Comparative.doc. The website for 
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When  are Judges and Bureaucrats Left  Independent? Theory and History from  Imperial 
Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States 
  
 
Our approach has been based on promotion of judges as an incentive scheme.   Even if 
members of an organization cannot be expelled or have their salaries reduced, the possibility of 
promotion   subjects them to the influence of whoever decides personnel policy. Carrots are just 
as much incentives as sticks;  the withholding of a reward   can be as effective as the  infliction 
of    a punishment.  Thus, despite the rhetoric of independence,   nations  in whose courts  judges   
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start   young and advance through the ranks depending on their talent and achievement  have left 
a significant opening for political influence.    We have found that in one of those nations, Japan,  
this structure has indeed produced politically skewed incentives.   
 On the one hand, the Japanese government offers parties to quarrels fiercely independent 
judges if the quarrel is private.  It does so because independent judicial resolution of private 
disputes is a service voters demand of the politicians who can influence judges.   On the other 
hand, when parties are locked in a dispute with the government,  the calculus  changes. 
  Independent judges for private disputes are part -- but only a part -- of the portfolio of 
policies and services for which voters elected the politicians.  Suppose the majority party keeps 
judges rigorously independent of itself  not just in  private-law disputes,  but   in public-law ones 
too.    If the personal preferences of judges diverge from those of the majority electorate, judges 
can use their independence to stymie the delivery of the majority's desired policies.  As a result, 
where a dispute involves politically charged issues, judges must worry about more than just what 
they think the law says or what they would personally like to see happen.   
To be sure, in some public-law disputes even Japanese politicians keep judges 
independent.  In mundane administrative disputes, or in those involving local politicians who 
may be out of synch with national sentiment, they can and do use independent judges to help 
monitor their bureaucratic agents, as we have found in our statistical analysis of tax disputes. 
Those disputes seldom raise major issues of policy but often involve misbehaving bureaucrats.  
By helping to keep bureaucrats in line, independent judges in these disputes can help politicians 
deliver their promised services (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).  In ordinary criminal disputes 
too, majority politicians apparently subject their judges to unbiased incentives.   And we do not 
contradict the conventional wisdom that Japanese politicians do not intervene directly and use 
crude methods such as giving direct commands as to how particular opinions should be written 
or  firing judges who disagree with them. The political influence is more subtle.   
 A finding that Japanese politicians have erected a structure in which judges have some 
independence but still are vulnerable to indirect political influence, however, raises two 
comparative puzzles. First,  why did those politicians choose a  degree of judicial independence  
different from other politicians  such  as those of imperial Japan (1868-1945) or the federal 
government of the United States?  Second, why do politicians anywhere make judges more 
independent than other kinds of bureaucrats?  
 
   First, under what circumstances will a ruling party give judges unbiased incentives in 
politically charged cases?  When will it instead subject them to biased incentives or replace them 
outright?  The usual bromides about making judges independent to protect  “discrete and insular 
minorities” take us nowhere.  Even in the United States., the most prominent examples of 
judicial protection of minorities turn out to involve minorities that are part of the coalition behind 
one of the principal political parties, as the Japanese-Americans discovered during World War II, 
and in Japan there has been both little supply of  and little demand  for  this kind of minority  
protection.  Hence  we are left wondering   in what circumstances majority party politicians will 
delegate discretion over decisions with serious electoral implications to judges they cannot 
constrain, and what means of control they will use if they decide not to delegate.  
We suggest an answer from the fundamental principle of the  theory of repeated games.  
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma,  rational players  who expect to play the game only once will   not 
refrain from taking advantage of each other in their choices.  Players who expect to play the 
game with each other indefinitely, on the other hand, have    incentive to cooperate if they think   
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that will induce the other side to cooperate with them later.  So too with whether rational 
politicians will keep their hands off of the courts.  Fundamentally, whether they keep them 
independent – the analog to the cooperative strategy in the prisoner's dilemma -- depends on two 
things:  (a) whether they expect elections to continue indefinitely, and (b)   whether they expect 
to alternate with the other party  in winning elections, if they do expect elections to continue.  
Only where the ruling party   expects there   to be future elections and believes it   has a good 
chance of being in and out of power will it favor independent courts.  And if  the ruling party  
does not wish to keep courts independent, the method it uses will depend on the length of time it 
expects to survive before losing power.
1  
We will illustrate this argument through three examples: modern Japan (Section I), the 
federal courts of the United States (Section II), and imperial (1868-1945) Japan (Section III).  In 
the   United States, politicians expect the electoral system to continue, but no one gives either 
party high odds of controlling the government indefinitely.  As a result, both parties have offered 
independent courts.  In modern Japan, politicians expect competitive elections to continue 
indefinitely, but until recently those in the ruling LDP rationally expected to win every time.  As 
a result, they offered less independent courts.  Since they expected to keep winning, however, 
they could use the leisurely control method of indirect influence over judicial promotions,  a 
method which helped retain the advantages of judicial independence in non-political disputes.   
In imperial Japan, none of the politicians could expect his party to always win elections, but none 
could expect the electoral system itself to continue either,  and the threat to elections was not 
from the current ruling party but from the military. As a result, the ruling politicians had short 
time horizons, and offered less independent courts controlled by cruder methods.  We outline this 
logic in Section IV.  We then, in Section V,  address the second of the comparative puzzles: why        
judiciaries  are different from other bureaucracies.  
 
Before we begin, however, a word of explanation may be helpful. We will speak of 
politicians choosing this and doing that with regard to policies and judges. This is  often literally 
true, but even then it is a bit misleading. Politicians must pay attention to voters.  In a 
competitive electoral regime, they must pay a lot of attention, and can usually be viewed as 
simply the tool of the electorate, with appropriate weight being given to those  who spend more 
of their time or money on trying to elect particular politicians. Even in a less democratic regime 
such as Meiji Japan, politicians must pay some attention to the populace, since popular support is 
one element of their power.  Moreover, constitutions are written by past politicians,  influenced 
by past citizens, and not by present politicians. Thus, when we speak of choice of a constitution 
by politicians, we are really speaking of the choice past politicians made under the influence of 
the voters, and of the choice of present politicians and voters not to try to make an effort to 
change the constitution.  Japan’s LDP did not write or adopt the modern Japanese constitution or 
the parliamentary act which specified details of the judicial system—indeed, the LDP had not yet 
been created at the time. But the LDP did maintain the constitution and judiciary act,  as part of 
the package it offered Japanese voters. And since LDP   politicians are the ones who make the 
decisions, as the agents of the voters, it will be most convenient to phrase our discussion in terms 
of the choices of politicians.   
                                                           
1 This argument can be found in Ramseyer (1994) and is modeled formally in Stephenson (2001), who draws 
attention to the importance of the parties’ forward-lookingness and   risk aversion and the judges’  independent 
positions not being too extreme.  Here, we will not rely on risk aversion, and we will subsume judges’  independent 
positions under the general cost of not monitoring judges closely.    
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I.   Modern Japan 
Japanese politicians in the LDP ruled Japan continuously from 1955 to 1993.  They did 
not hold power this long by chance.  In part, they held it by providing median voter policies, 
aided by the reluctance of opposition Socialists and Communists to moderate their ideologies.  In 
part too, they held it by rationally manipulating the institutional structure of government to their 
electoral advantage.  In the process, they manipulated the judiciary as well.   
The modern Japanese Constitution vests the “whole judicial power,” in the courts.  It 
bans other judicial institutions (Art.  76(a)) and gives parties to administrative disputes the right 
to appeal to the courts (Art.  76(b)).  It further declares that “judges shall be independent in the 
exercise of their conscience and shall be bound by the Constitution and the laws” (Art.  76(c)).  
Although the Cabinet does appoint judges to the Supreme Court and lower courts, it cannot fire 
them at will.  Instead, only the Diet can fire them, and only through impeachment (Art.  78). To 
impeach, the Diet must find that a judge grossly violated the standards of the office, neglected 
the duties of the job, or dishonored the institution of the courts.
2  These articles and excerpts 
from the 1889 Japan and 1789 U.S. constitutions  can be found in the Appendix at the end of this 
chapter.    
Although Japanese judges have not been as independent as their American peers,
3 the 
reason does not lie in any of the obvious institutional constraints.
4  The Japanese Diet seldom 
impeaches judges.  From 1948 to 1989, its Judicial Impeachment Committee received 5,700 
impeachment complaints but ruled against the judges only 12 times.
5  As noted in Chapter 1, 
Japanese voters have never expelled a Supreme Court justice in a retention vote, and the 
Japanese Cabinet rarely refuses to rehire a judge at the end of a ten-year term.   
Instead, LDP leaders have controlled judges more subtly, through the job assignment 
process we have been studying in this book.  They controlled assignments through the court’s 
administrative office, the Supreme Court Secretariat.  In turn, they controlled the Secretariat 
through the series of strategic moves we have explained earlier.  First, in part because the 
Supreme Court formally controls the Secretariat, they appointed only loyal LDP partisans to the 
Supreme Court.  Second, to ensure that their Supreme Court appointees did not change their 
views while in office, the LDP leaders appointed them late in life.  As a result, Japanese Supreme 
Court justices served a mean of only six years before retiring at age seventy (ZSKS, 1990: 468-
70).  Third, LDP leaders regularly appointed to the Supreme Court a career judge who had 
                                                           
2 Saibansho ho [Judiciary Act], Law No.  59 of April 16, 1947; Saibankan dangai ho [Judicial Impeachment 
Act].  Law No.  137 of November 20, 1947, § 3.  Judges can also lose their job if declared “mentally or physically 
incompetent” by a court (Constitution, Art.  78). 
3 For some empirical evidence that American federal judges may not act quite as independently as we have 
often thought, see Cohen (1992, 1991); Spiller & Gely (1992); Toma (1991), De Figueiredo and  Tiller  (1996). 
4 To be sure, this does not make the institutional structure irrelevant.  If judges know that the Diet can 
impeach them, that the Cabinet may refuse to rehire them, or that voters can expel them, they may ignore majority 
preferences less.  If so, then in equilibrium, politicians and voters would not often exercise the institutional control 
anyway.  Judges would not ignore majority preferences, and voters and politicians would not punish them. 
5 ZSKS (1990).  On the frequency of impeachments in the United States, see Culver & Cruikshanks (1982).   
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headed the Secretariat.  At all times, therefore, they had on the Court a loyal partisan who knew 
in detail how the administrative offices worked. 
LDP leaders used this control over the Secretariat to reward judges  in part according     
to whether they decided politically important cases  the way the LDP politicians and voters 
wanted.  Through the Secretariat, they institutionalized a system in which judges who decided 
controversial cases the right way by their lights   (and who otherwise did good work) went to 
important positions in Tokyo.  Others went to the branch offices.  Indirectly to be sure, through 
this control over job assignments they influenced judges by promoting some and by not 
promoting others.  
 
II.   The United States 
A.  The Twentieth Century: 
In contrast, American federal politicians implicitly follow a strict hands-off-the-courts 
rule.  Unless a judge is insane, rankly incompetent, or crooked, they let him sit in court and draw 
the standard salary.  Whether he implements the majority party’s ideology or anything else, they 
largely let him be. 
American federal politicians do try to shape judicial ideology at the stage of  a judge’s 
initial appointment, but  not later, and often not even then   Over the decades, some politicians 
have weighted ideology heavily, others more lightly.  Few, however, have ignored it altogether, 
and few have picked more than a trivial number of judges from the rival party (Freund, 1988). 
Nonetheless, the implicit hands-off-the-courts rule is strong enough that sometimes 
observers criticize even attempts to influence the judiciary at the appointment stage.  When 
Ronald Reagan nominated Robert Bork, some Democrats claimed he violated an implicit 
agreement to appoint only centrist jurists.  When Bill Clinton named Lani Guinier to a position 
in the Attorney General’s office, many Republicans argued the same.   And when  the Senate, 
which must approve all appointments,  hesitates because of ideology, the President’s supporters 
cry foul.   The Democrats’ successful  campaign to block Bork gave rise to the derogatory term 
“borking”, even though it was merely a publicity campaign to influence senators’  approval 
votes.  
The implicit hands-off-the-courts rule is deeply held, as Franklin Roosevelt discovered.  
When the Supreme Court rejected his New Deal, he proposed to enlarge the Court.  Nothing in 
the Constitution required that it have nine justices.  Indeed, politicians had manipulated its size to 
political ends before,
6 and one of the Court’s hostile judges—James McReynolds-- had, when 
US Attorney General in 1913 as part of  a Democratic Administration that followed a long string 
of Republican presidents, authored a report favoring a court-packing scheme much like 
Roosevelt's (Manchester, 1973: 183).  And increasing the size of the lower courts was,  everyone 
seemed to think--and still thinks-- perfectly fair game (see De Figueiredo & Tiller, 1996).    By 
enlarging the Court to fifteen and appointing committed New Dealers to it, Roosevelt planned to 
build the Court majority he needed to implement the programs for which he won his electoral 
landslide (Currie, 1990: 235-36; Leuchtenburg, 1966). 
Even Roosevelt’s friends balked.  Not only were judicial careers off-limits to American 
politicians, apparently the number of justices was off-limits too.  Roosevelt may have won by a 
landslide in 1936, but in politics, as in much of life, turnabout is fair play.  What the 
                                                           
6 See the discussion of the 1801 Judiciary Act, below, and the instances cited in Choper (1974: 850-52); 
Mason (1937: 667-68).   
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Congressional Democrats could do to the Republicans,  someone else—perhaps the Republicans, 
perhaps President Roosevelt--  could do to them.  The Congressional  Democrats knew that they 
would eventually lose office, either to a revived Republican party (as actually happened) or to a 
different faction of the Democratic Party.
7  If they set a precedent for manipulating   Court size 
now,  it could come back to haunt them.  That, many of them did not want.  Rather than renege 
on the implicit rule now, they opted to risk Roosevelt’s entire program.   
 
B.  The Early Nineteenth Century: 
By the standards of the early republic, Roosevelt’s scheme was meek.  Politicians a 
century earlier had not followed any hands-off-the-courts rule.  Before the Revolution, the 
Crown had sometimes controlled judicial careers (Surrency, 1967).  After the Revolution, voters 
in many states did the same.  Some states made judges elected officials and kept them on a short 
lease with   one-year terms.  Others gave control to the politicians, letting  their judges hold 
office only at the pleasure of the legislature (Ellis, 1971). 
Not only were state court judges subject to loss of their jobs, federal courts were fair 
game too.  Consider the shift from Federalist to Republican rule.
8  In 1800, Thomas Jefferson 
beat John Adams in a bitter election, and Adams was not amused.  With but two weeks left in his 
term, he engineered the 1801 Judiciary Act (2 Stat. 89).  Through it, he expanded the judiciary 
and packed it with party loyalists (Turner, 1961).  Along with stacking the courts, he also cut the 
size of the Supreme Court.  It had been six.  He now cut it to five, effective on the next 
retirement.  Thereby, he prevented Jefferson from appointing anyone to the court until two 
justices quit. 
Upon taking office, Jefferson retaliated in kind.  First, he fired Adams’s nonjudicial 
appointees.  Then  he fired all the new judges.  Given Article III of the U.S. Constitution, he 
could not do so directly, of course.  If Adams’s Congress had passed the 1801 Judiciary Act, 
however, Jefferson’s Congress could repeal it.  Repeal it his Congress did (2 Stat. 132, 1802).  In 
the process, it threw   the judges appointed under the 1801 Act out of their jobs.  By the 
Constitution, they held their office during “good Behavior.”  Yet their office itself was a creature 
of Congress, and  what Congress could create, Congress could abolish.  It   abolished their 
offices, and the judges were  judges without postings – whether on good behavior or bad.  Lest 
John Marshall’s Federalist Supreme Court rule the ploy unconstitutional, Congress recessed the 
Court for fourteen months.
9 
By the time the Supreme Court finally faced the issue, even the Federalist justices had 
lost their nerve.  They declined to hold the 1802 Act unconstitutional (Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I 
                                                           
7 In 1937 Roosevelt's Democrats controlled over  75 percent of each house of Congress.   In 1936 the Republicans  
had lost 5 million presidential votes since their heavy defeat in 1932,  the first Depression election   and Roosevelt 
had won the presidential  electoral college 523 to 8,  joking,   "I knew I should have gone to Maine and Vermont..."  
(Manchester, 1973: 174).  Yet by 1946  the Republicans had regained Congress,  and in 1952,  the Presidency.  
 
8 The Republican Party of Jefferson eventually changed its name and is the Democratic Party of the year 
2000.  The present-day Republican Party was only founded in the 1850's.  
9 Even at the time, not all observers thought that the judges should lose their salary.  See Story (1833: v. 3, 
494) (on the 1802 Act: “if its constitutionality can be successfully vindicated, [it] prostrates in the dust the 
independence of all inferior judges”); Haskins & Johnson (1981: v. 2, 171-72).  More recently, at least some 
Supreme Court justices have argued that abolishing the courts would simply create salaried judges without courts.  
See, e.g., Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-47 (1962) (Harlan, J.).   
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Cranch) 299 (1803)).  Discretion may have saved them their jobs, for many Republicans were 
ready to go further.  Some wanted to amend the Constitution and appoint judges to serve at the 
pleasure of Congress.  Others wanted to abolish the courts altogether  and rely on the state courts 
(Ellis, 1971: 21). 
Moderation prevailed.  The Republicans never amended the Constitution to control the 
judges, and no one even abolished judges’ jobs again.  Indeed, when Congress abolished the 
Commerce Court at the turn of the century, it simply kept the judges on the payroll (Donegan v. 
Dyson, 269 U.S. 49 (1925)).  By Roosevelt’s time, this moderation had become the modern 
hands-off-the-courts rule.  Even Supreme Court size was now sacred. 
 
   
 
C.  Judicial Might-Have-Beens: 
 
As we have seen, in America the constitutional text is not always a good guide to 
constitutional practice.   The Constitution allows Congress to abolish judicial offices, limit 
jurisdiction, change Supreme Court size, and reject   presidential appointments, but the extent to 
which these practices have been used has varied widely over time.   Japanese and American 
politicians treat   judges differently, but not because of any differences in the constitutional text.  
If they chose, Japanese politicians could insulate judges from political control.  At least by the 
text of the Constitution, American politicians could intervene LDP-style in the courts. 
 
Start with the Japanese Constitution.  It   does not forbid the Japanese government from 
passing implementation laws setting up a system very  like the American one.  The chief 
constraint on the lower courts is Article 80, which says, “The judges of the inferior courts shall 
be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such 
judges shall hold office for a term of ten(10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that 
they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.”    Thus, the Supreme Court 
and Cabinet must agree on appointments, rather than the President and Senate as in the United 
States. But the Diet could pass an implementation law setting a retirement age of 100 and 
establishing separate posts for trial courts and appellate courts, and it could specify that judges 
are not to be transferred from their initial posts without their consent and without going through 
the appointment process again.      Combined with the current custom of almost-automatic 
reappointment, the result would be much like the current U.S. federal system. Thus, the 
constitutional  text does not mandate the current system in Japan; it could be changed by the 
politicians if they wanted.    
 
  
Look now to   the U.S. Constitution.  Once a judge takes office, the President cannot 
freely fire him or dock his pay (U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1).  Suppose John Doe becomes President 
and appoints eminent University of Chicago Professor I. Jones to the local Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals in downtown Chicago.  Neither Doe nor any of his successors could fire Jones 
without evidence of serious fault (U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1; Shartel, 1930; Block, 1970).  Neither 
could anyone reduce his pay.  That is all the American Constitution says on point, and the 
Japanese Constitution says much the same thing.  Legislatures in both countries could impeach 
judges whose decisions they  disliked,  but in neither country do they impeach except for such 
things as  criminal offenses.    
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 Where the two systems diverge is not in their constitutions, but in the laws that the 
legislatures pass  to implement the day-to-day aspects of a judicial system -- what judges do, and 
where they do it.  In principle, these laws can be changed as easily  and often as the tax code.     
We have seen that politicians in Japan could change the judicial administration law to imitate the 
U.S. system if they wished.    Similarly, in America our  hypothetical President Doe need not be 
very creative to penalize Judge Jones.  Even under the existing statute, he can transfer him.  For 
example, suppose the President has the Chief Justice on his side.  If he can make a plausible 
showing of need, he can order Jones to show up “temporarily” for work in Omaha (28 U.S.C. § 
291). 
Or suppose President Doe, like Roosevelt and  the LDP, has a majority of his party in the 
legislative branch.  He   decides the Seventh Circuit is a hotbed of unreconstructed radicals.  To 
punish the judges, he could merge the Seventh Circuit into the adjoining Eighth (28 U.S.C. § 48).  
He could then force the Chicagoans to appear for work in either St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, 
or St. Paul.  Or maybe all four, in rotation.   The Supreme Court itself once held that Congress 
could order the justices to ride circuit (Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803)).  By 
comparison, sending Chicago judges to Omaha seems mild. 
More comprehensively, if President Doe’s allies controlled Congress they could import 
the entire Japanese system on a turnkey basis.  They would first abolish the statutory circuit 
designations (28 U.S.C. § 48; Posner, 1985: 25).  All judges would then serve on one national 
circuit.  Either directly or through the Chief Justice, Doe could now transfer judges at will.  Like 
the LDP leaders, he would reward the faithful with glamorous posts.  He would dispatch the 
renegades to the outback. 
Indeed, Doe could do more.  The President now appoints judges as either district or 
circuit judges (28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133).  With a modest statutory change, he could appoint all 
judges as “federal judges.”  Depending on their performance, he could move them on or off 
appellate panels.  Similarly, all district judges now earn the same pay, and so do the circuit 
judges.  With a little change, he could establish a salary range, staring everyone with a low salary 
and  then rewarding   the faithful with bigger and more frequent raises. 
The   U.S. Constitution prevents none of this.  Before 1891, the President appointed only 
two tiers of federal judges -- district judges and Supreme Court justices (Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 
517, 28 Stat. 826; Posner, 1985: 23-24).  As recently as 1875, district judges received a salary 
from a pay range (Posner, 1985: 43).  And when the Congress abolished the short-lived 
Commerce Court (Act of Oct. 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 219), existing Commerce Court judges 
became judges without a court.  Like Japanese judges, they sat wherever the Supreme Court 
Chief Justice told them to sit (Donegan v. Dyson, 269 U.S. 49 (1925)). 
Although modern Japanese judges enjoy less political independence than federal judges, 
the difference has nothing to do with the constitutional text.  The Japanese Constitution does not 
require the ruling party to  intervene  in the courts; the   American Constitution does not prevent 
Congress and the President from intervening in the courts.   Before considering further why 
modern Japanese and American politicians do adopt different approaches (in Section IV), 
consider first the approach that Japanese politicians took before the Second World War (in 
Section III). 
 
III.  Imperial Japan 
A.    Introduction:   
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The 1889 Japanese Constitution
10 seemed to give judges less independence than the 
modern Constitution.  After all, the imperial judges were under the Ministry of Justice rather 
than a formally independent Supreme Court.  Nonetheless, actual practice differed little.  Before 
the Second World War as after, political leaders could use the judicial career structure to 
influence the way judges decided cases. 
 
B.  Judicial Structure: 
The 1889 Constitution (Art. 58(b); see Arts. 59-61) set the basic institutional contours of 
judicial independence:  “no judge shall be dismissed from work except through a criminal 
conviction or disciplinary disposition.”  The 1890 Judicial Organization Act (1890 Act)
11   
specified the detail for this constitutional mandate.  Although it placed courts squarely within the 
Ministry of Justice (1890 Act, § 135), it insulated judges from control in several ways.
12 
First, the 1890 Act prohibited the Minister of Justice from transferring a judge against his 
will (1890 Act, § 73).  Second, it let him order a judge to retire only if the judge no longer had 
the physical or mental capacity to perform his work and he obtained the approval of the en banc 
High Court or Supreme Court (1890 Act, § 74).  Third, it let him discipline a judge only if the 
judge had misbehaved egregiously, and only through proceedings before panels of either the 
High Court or the Supreme Court.
13  Last, because the act did not specify a mandatory retirement 
age, it effectively gave judges life tenure. Thus, the imperial judge had all the protections of the 
modern judge, and more besides.  
This institutional framework made it hard for government leaders to manipulate the 
judiciary.  Notwithstanding that difficulty, the oligarchs of late 19
th century Japan soon decided 
to do an end run around this  framework, as we will shortly describe.  Thirty-some years later, 
the professional politicians who followed them to power would do the same. 
 
C.  Oligarchic Manipulation: 
At the turn of the century, a clique of unelected oligarchs  held power in Japan.   
Formally, they held power by virtue of their access to the Emperor.  Substantively, they held it  
by virtue of their control over the military.  Already by the mid-1890s, these men had intervened 
in the judiciary. 
These oligarchs intervened primarily for technical  reasons, not political ones.  They had 
                                                           
10 Dai-Nippon teikoku kempo [The Constitution of the Great Japanese empire], promulgated Feb.  1, 1889. 
11 Saibansho kosei ho [Judicial Organization Act], Law No.  6 of Feb. 10, 1890.  Further details on the 
status of judges were determined by the Hanji kenji ken nado hokyurei [Order Regarding the Compensation of 
Judges and Prosecutors, Etc.], Chokurei No.  17 of Feb. 14, 1894. 
12 Why the oligarchs did this is not clear, though it probably had to do with renegotiating the consular 
jurisdiction imposed by Western governments under the treaties in effect at the time. 
13 The judge would then face penalties ranging from pay cuts to impeachment.  Hanji chukai ho [Judicial 
Disciplinary Act], Law No. 68 of August 20, 1890, §§ 2-9.   
  Page 10 
 
created the judicial system itself in 1872.
14   During the first two decades, they had hired as 
judges men with very little legal education.  They had had little choice, for legally trained men 
were not available.  By the 1890s, the new university system gave them a large cadre of men 
with sophisticated legal training.  Accordingly, if the untrained judges could be removed, they 
could be replaced by newcomers far better educated. Therefore, during the nineteen months from 
July 1893 to March 1894 and August 1898 to May  1899, they told 158 judges to retire.
15 
The institutional framework did not make this straightforward.  If the Minister of Justice 
ordered a judge to retire, or even to move to an obscure provincial court, the judge could 
properly refuse.  If the Minister wanted to  force  the judge to retire, he had to submit the matter 
to the High Court or Supreme Court with accusations of   incapacity or misconduct.  He had no 
assurance, however, that the courts would decide matters the way he wanted, and in any case the 
publicity would be undesirable and stigma would be attached to ex-judges who were, after all, 
first appointed by the patronage of the ruling clique. 
So to induce judges not to contest his contestable order, the Minister of Justice bribed 
them.  He did this  by promoting them to more prestigious courts at higher pay in exchange for 
their agreeing to retire quickly and quietly thereafter.  This not only gave them the face-saving 
chance to resign from a higher court, and after a recent promotion had indicated the government's 
regard for their talent,  it also boosted their pension.  Under the rules then in effect, a judge’s 
pension depended on his total years of service and his final pay.
16  If  he earned his final high 
salary for a day, he earned a highly paid judge’s pension for the rest of his life. 
The Minister of Justice bribed judges with pensions on a wide scale.  During the last 
months of 1898 and early months of 1899, the Ministry of Justice even appointed 15 judges to 
the 29-member Supreme Court.
17  Court-packing?  No.  The new judges served terms of one day 
to three weeks each.  The Minister agreed to name them to the Court; they agreed to quit; and 
everybody kept their bargain. The judiciary was rejuvenated, and if there remained some less 
competent old judges who had refused the bribes, they were few enough not to reduce the 
effectiveness of the system at delivering legal decisions to the public.  
 
D.  Political Manipulation: 
Over the next several decades,   control of the Cabinet gradually shifted from the aging 
Meiji oligarchs to a new breed of  professional politicians in the Diet.  In 1889, shortly after the 
promulgation  of the Constitution, Prime Minister Kuroda made it clear that constitutional 
government did not mean government at the behest of the voters. In a famous speech he laid out 
his theory of  “transcendental government,”  in which not just the judiciary but also the executive 
                                                           
14 See Shiho shokumu teisei [Rules Regarding Judicial Functions], Dajokan unnumbered Tatsu of Aug. 3, 
1872.  The Supreme Court (Daishin’in) was created by the Daishin’in sho saibansho shokusei shotei [Rules and 
Duties of the Supreme Court and Other Courts], Dajokan Fukoku No. 91 of May 24, 1875. 
15 Ramseyer & Rosenbluth (1995: ch. 6).  The capacity of the courts at the time was about 1200 judges.  
See Chokurei No.  17 of Feb. 14, 1894 (1,220 judges); Chokurei No. 122 of June 20, 1898 (1,195 judges). 
16 See Kanshi onkyu ho [Government Employee Pension Act], Law No.  43 of June 21, 1890, § 5. 
17 Kusunoki (1989: 282-93).  For the size of the Supreme Court, see Hanji kenji ken nado hokyurei, supra 
note 63, § 2.   
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branch would  be independent, free from   the grubby hands of the politicians: “The government  
must always take a fixed course. It must stand above and outside the political parties and cleave 
to the path of supreme fairness and supreme justice. (Sashihara, Meiji Seishi, p. 1931, as reported 
in Mitani, 1988, p. 57). If judicial independence is a good thing, why not executive 
independence?  With the military and the other oligarchs on his side, nobody argued with Kuroda 
in 1889.   By the 1920’s, however,   power had shifted. The transition was gradual, but  1924 was 
a turning point.  In that year, after two years of cabinets that contained not a single member of 
the House of Representatives, the politicians rebelled.  The leaders of the major parties 
announced their dissatisfaction, formed a coalition, and won the next general election.  The 
Cabinet of peers  resigned and was replaced by a politician-dominated cabinet.  From that time 
until 1932, Japan clearly  had an executive branch responsive to the electorate. The oligarchs 
were gone, and the politicians were in control.  Ominously, an independent military waited in the 
wings, no longer under the personal control of the people running the government.  In the 
judicial sphere, the politicians inherited from the oligarchs an institutional legacy that 
complicated their ability to constrain judges. 
At an aggregate level, the data on senior  appointments  in the Ministry of Justice in panel 
A of Table  7-1   show a curious pattern of  political involvement from 1925, the year of the first  
Cabinet after grand coalition of 1924 fell apart, to 1931, the year before the military 
commandeered the government.  Panel A shows the number of months from  a Cabinet change to 
personnel change, if any  personnel change did occur within a year after the Cabinet change. The 
Parliamentary Vice Minister was of course  immediately changed every time—that post is  meant 
to be occupied by a politician. The equally high-ranked  Administrative Vice Minister of Justice 
was  replaced only by Prime Ministers Giichi Tanaka and Tsuyoshi Inukai.  No prime minister 
ever replaced either the Civil Bureau Chief or the Chief Prosecutor.  Panel B shows statistics for 
somewhat lower-ranked officials, comparing how many posts were reassigned in the first two 
months of the new Cabinet with how many were reassigned in the subsequent ten months.     
Except for Inukai’s replacement of 12 chief district court prosecutors (of which more later), no 
new Cabinet ever replaced more than three officials in the ranks covered by Panel  B within two 
months.   Adding ten extra months increases the turnover considerably, but even then less than 
half the officials are replaced—and remember that  parties stayed in power only about two year 
at  a time during this period.    Compare this with the United States, where despite the inevitable 
disruption in government business it creates,  a new administration of a different  party replaces 
en masse not just the higher-ranking officials, but the U.S. Attorneys,  the equivalent of the  
Chief Prosecutors of the District Courts.  
  To the U.S. observer, the turnover in judges in Panel B of Figure 7. 1 looks higher.   
Although judges were not replaced immediately after the new Cabinet  gained control,  within a 
year an average of 16.25 of the 51 chief  judges of district courts were replaced. Is this a  large 
number?   Not really. If a typical term in a particular posting was 3 years, as it was post-war, the 
number would be 17, even without any political intervention    
  Table 7.2  takes a different approach.  Focussing just on judges, it shows the number of  
(a) appointments to the Supreme Court and (b) forced retirements of judges generally.    It shows 
the number of each of these in the four months of a  Cabinet of a new party and the four months 
immediately preceding the Cabinet change.  Notice first that until 1931,  none of the three prime 
ministers  who replaced a prime minister of a different party  either appointed more supporters to 
the top of the judiciary (the Supreme Court) or fired more at the bottom (through forced 
retirements) than their predecessors had done in the preceding four months.  The preceding   
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Cabinets appointments could all have been fired, and those judges they  forced to retire could 
have been reappointed, but this seems not to have happened.      On reconfiguring his Cabinet in 
1925, Kato seems not to have fired any more judges than he had   in the months before.    Tanaka 
and Hamaguchi  fired a few more, but the difference barely shows.    These tables do not show 
intervention in the judiciary taking the form of replacing the previous adminstration’s judges 
with one’s own.  Rather,  the personnel of the judiciary stayed largely the same.   By U.S. 
standards, firing about one judge per month seems extreme, but at that rate, it would take a long 
time to turn over the entire judiciary.    That the firings were not concentrated in the months after 
a new party took power suggests that the firings were relatively nonpartisan, the exercise of 
political control but not partisan control.  We may speculate that the judges were fired for 
incompetence or misbehavior, or for political reasons on which all of the parties strong enough to 
form Cabinets agreed: that socialists are bad and so are holdovers from the Meiji oligarchy  and 
supporters of the army who show signs of  favoring  transcendental or military rule.  
While showing that partisan politics was not a major force in the judiciary, however, 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2  understate the extent that politicians   manipulated the courts.  Back in 1913,  
the Seiyukai had controlled both the Cabinet and the Diet.  That April it set out to reshape the 
personnel of the courts.  It first amended the Judicial Organization Act to ease its job.
18  Under 
the revised act, the Minister of Justice could transfer judges against their will by a simple 
majority vote in either the High Court or the Supreme Court.  Through a similar vote, he could 
place as many as 232 judges and prosecutors on inactive status.  From April to June, the Minister 
retired 98 judges and prosecutors, placed 131 on inactive status, and transferred 443 (Nomura, 
1966: v. 3, 382). 
When the Seiyukai regained the Diet and Cabinet several years later, it instituted 
mandatory judicial retirement (Law No. 6 of May 17, 1921).  By doing so, it automatically 
purged many of the men appointed by the oligarchs  and  could install its own.  During the dozen 
years after 1913 , it controlled the Cabinet only about half of the time.  Although the remaining 
years might have given the rival Kenseikai party time to appoint its own sympathizers to the 
Ministry, it did not.  Instead, it wasted almost half its term in office with a Minister of Justice,  
Yukio Ozaki,  who had little interest in personnel issues (Yamaoka, 1925; Shiho, 1925). 
The Seiyukai  thus did intervene in the Ministry of Justice in the years before Tables 7-1 
and  7-2.  The rival Kenseikai party was not altogether passive either.   Consider the career of 
Mannosuke Yamaoka.  On finishing college in 1899, Yamaoka worked as a prosecutor’s 
apprentice and then as a Tokyo judge.  After a stint in Germany, he returned to Japan in 1910 as 
a prosecutor.  By 1914, he had endeared himself to a Seiyukai-affiliated senior bureaucrat.  With 
that patronage, he moved into a series of important posts, and by 1925 headed the Criminal 
Bureau.  Then, under a Kenseikai Cabinet, the Minister of Justice summarily placed him on 
inactive status (Hosojima, 1964: 45-95; Shiho, 1925).  Legal commentators complained that 
politicians were politicizing the judiciary, but Yamaoka was graceful in his response:   
 
I do think I’ve been impartial, ... but if you look at the Ministry of Justice from the Kenseikai’s 
perspective, you’ll see it’s just about completely stacked with Seiyukai people.  It’s true that Mr. 
                                                           
18 Law No. 6 of Apr. 5, 1913; Law No. 7 of Apr. 5, 1913.  Law No. 6 in fact provided that the transfer 
provision applied “when necessary for trial business.”  Because the Judicial Organization Act already allowed the 
minister of justice to transfer judges when it was necessary to fill a vacancy (1890 Act, § 73 proviso), ordinary 
canons of statutory interpretation suggest this was a looser requirement.   
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Ozaki was Minister of Justice for a while under the [1914] Okuma Cabinet, but he stayed almost 
totally aloof from these things.  As a result, there’s hardly any trace of the Kenseikai there. 
(Shiho, 1925)   
 
Whatever modest independence the judiciary had in the 1920’s  it lost   completely when 
Seiyukai party leader Inukai became prime minister in 1931—he of the 12 prosecutors replaced 
within two months in Figure 7.1B.    Because the military usurped the government in 1932, he 
was the last prime minister to take office as a party politician.  He dominated the courts 
straightforwardly.
19  Even before he took office, some observers predicted he would make 
massive changes (3352 Horitsu shimbun 17 (1931)).  He did indeed.  Within four months of 
taking office on December 13, 1931, he appointed 13 justices to the 29-member Supreme Court 
and fired 29 lower-court judges (Table 7-2).  A day later (on April 14, 1932), he announced yet 
another massive series of personnel changes.  The legal press called it “The Great Judicial Office 
Shuffle.” In one day, he transferred 213 judges and prosecutors (3396 Horitsu shimbun 19 
(1932)).  Perhaps he was relying on his overwhelming electoral victory over the opposition 
Minseito Party.   Neither electoral strength nor judicial intervention proved as decisive, however, 
as Inukai’s  assassination by a group of naval cadets  a month later on May 15, after which he 
was replaced as Prime Minister by Admiral Saito.  
All told, the independent judiciary has a spotty record in imperial Japan.  Under the 
oligarchs, it lacked independence--though with good effect on its professional quality.   Under 
the politicians,  some prime ministers were strong enough and interested enough to try to change 
the personnel of the judicial branch and others were not, and by the  end of party rule, judges   
clearly lacked independence.  
                                                           
19 The claim in Mitani (1980: 18-19) that the judiciary remained independent from the political parties 
misses some of what happened in the 1920s and almost all of what happened in 1931.   
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A. Major  posts:* 
(months till a replacement)
 
   Adm. vice minister  
   Par. vice minister 
   Chief, Criminal Bureau  
   Chief, Civil Bureau 
   Chief prosecutor, S.Ct. 
   Ass. prosecutor, S.Ct.  
 
   Chief justice, S.Ct. 
 
B. Subsidiary  posts:† 
(reassignments within 2 
months and the next 12 
months) 
 
   Ch. prosecutor, High Ct.    
(7 posts) 
   Ch. prosecutor, D.Ct.       
(51 posts) 
   Section chief, S.Ct. 
(8 posts) 
 
   Ch. judge, High Ct. 
(7 posts) 
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 Notes:   The Wakatsuki Cabinets are omitted because they followed 
Cabinets of the same party (the Kenseikai in 1926 and the Minseito in 
1931). 
     * Months from Cabinet change to personnel change, if within one 
year; blank if there was no personnel change.  
     † Number of reassignments within two months, followed by number of 
additional reassignments within shorter of (i) subsequent ten months and 
(ii) period of time until change in party controlling Cabinet. 
 
     Sources:  Calculated on the basis of data found in Ikuhiko Hata, 
Senzenki Nihon kanryosei no seido, soshiki, jinji [The system, 
organization, and personnel of the pre-war Japanese bureaucracy] 359-65 
(1981); Shiho sho, ed., Shiho enkskushi [A documentary history of the 
judiciary] 557-836 (1939, republished 1960). 
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Table 7-2:  Judicial Forced Retirements During the Four Months 
Before and After Cabinet Changes 
 
 
 Before  After 
 
A.  No. of judges assigned to S. Ct.: 
     Kato (August 2, 1925, Kenseikai)  
     Tanaka (April 20, 1927 Seiyukai) 
     Hamaguchi (July 2, 1929, Minseito) 
     Inukai (December 13, 1931, Seiyukai) 
 
B.  No. of judges forceably retired: 
     Kato (August 2, 1925, Kenseikai) 
     Tanaka (April 20, 1927, Seiyukai) 
     Hamaguchi (July 2, 1929, Minseito) 

























   
   Note:  “Forced retirement” refers to judges officially 
ordered to retire—those for whom the notice “taishoku wo 
meizu” appeared in the official government gazette, the 
Kanpo.  
      The Wakatsuki Cabinets are omitted because they 
followed Cabinets of the same party. 
 
     Source:  Compiled from the daily government gazette, 
Kanpo [Government gazette] (various issues). 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
IV.  A Theory of Judicial Independence 
A.  Introduction: 
It is a tale of three courts:  a relatively independent   American federal judiciary, a 
relatively nonindependent modern Japanese judiciary, and   an even less independent imperial 
Japanese judiciary.  These differences do not derive from constitutional texts.  Neither do they 
obviously derive from any stronger American taste for independent courts.  After all, many 
Japanese observers react to judicial career manipulation with the same consternation that many 
Americans would show, and many Americans wish their judges could be forced to  show more 
restraint.  
Nor does modern theory explain the differences.  To date, most scholars try to explain 
why rational politicians   find it advantageous to use independent courts, rather than why some   
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politicians   find it advantageous while others do not.  In perhaps the most innovative article on 
point, William Landes and Richard Posner (1975) advanced independent courts as a way for 
politicians to make long-term bargains with their constituents.  Without independent courts, they 
argued, politicians would have an incentive to cheat on any deals their predecessors made—or, 
indeed, on any they made themselves.  Constituents then  reward politicians less for passing  
advantageous statutes, knowing that the statutes might be nullified by the courts at the 
politicians’ direction.  
Indeed, the problem would exist even in a one-party.  Politician X might  wish to accept 
contributions    in exchange for passing law Y.  If he can instruct the bureaucrats to disregard law 
Y and act as if it had never been passed, however, no forward-looking contributer  would pay 
him for its passage.  The government could not even obtain supplies by procurement contracts 
without  paying a hefty risk premium; if the court were always on the government’s side,  the 
supplier would lose any contract dispute.  
Independent judges, Landes and Posner suggested, mitigate  this problem.  Precisely 
because of their independence, they are willing to  enforce legislative deals.  By stopping 
successor parties from reneging on their predecessors’ deals, and by preventing even the original 
parties to the deal from reneging,  the judges would help all legislators extract the money or 
power for which they sold their deals to the voting public.  Douglass North and Barry Weingast 
(1989)  seem to find evidence for the theory in seventeenth-century England.  Placed  in a 
broader theoretical framework, the theory fits within what Oliver Williamson (1993; Moe, 1991) 
and others have since described as purposefully inefficient bureaucracies.   “Incumbent 
politicians who create and design bureaus are aware that the opposition can be expected to win 
and take control in the future,” explains Williamson.  “A farsighted majority party will therefore 
design some degree of (apparent) inefficiency into the agency at the outset -- the effect of which 
will be to frustrate the efforts of successor administrations to reshape the purpose served by the 
agency.” 
Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984) advance a hypothesis with a different 
twist – one we introduced in Chapter 5 in connection with tax disputes.  They argue that 
independent judges help politicians monitor the people they appoint to bureaucratic posts.   
Monitoring bureaucrats routinely  would entail resources politicians do not wish to use.   
Politicians instead keep bureaucrats in line by giving constituents a right to sue them in 
independent courts.  In this theory, courts are kept independent of politicians because politicians 
would have to use bureaucrats to monitor non-independent courts, and this would make it 
difficult for the courts to monitor the bureaucrats.  
Absent other considerations, both the Landes-Posner or the McCubbins-Schwartz 
theories imply that competitive electoral markets should lead to one equilibrium outcome:   
independent courts.  Perhaps politicians who keep courts independent will more successfully 
raise money (Landes-Posner), or perhaps they will more successfully monitor their bureaucrats 
(McCubbins -Schwartz).  In either case, politicians who keep courts independent should compete 
more successfully in electoral markets than those who do not.  In either case, the forward-
looking politician will establish independent courts as the first item on his agenda.  In either case, 
independent courts would arise over time even if politicians were less aware of their interests, as 
the evolutionary pressure of electoral competition drove politicians who could not keep their 
deals into extinction.  
But of course this is not true.  Not all regimes have independent judges.  This calls 
attention to differences both among different types of cases, and among the electoral framework   
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within which politicians compete.  We discussed the former in Chapters 4 through 6.  We turn 
now to the possibility that the differences in judicial monitoring might result from different 
electoral exigencies.  In the U.S.-Japanese comparison, those exigencies are twofold:  
 
(a) the long-term electoral dominance of the LDP in postwar Japan compared to the erratic 
electoral performance of American political parties; and  
(b) the long-term likelihood of continued democratic elections in the United States, compared 




B.  A General Theory of Comparative Independence: 
Although modern Japanese elections are highly competitive affairs, for nearly forty years 
the LDP consistently won them.
20  Partly by shifting its policies to follow the shifting median 
voter and partly by using its control over government to give constituents generous private 
goods, it dominated the political marketplace (see generally Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1997: chs. 
2-5).  By contrast, American parties win erratically.  As a result, LDP leaders could reasonably 
expect that they would continue to control the government indefinitely.
21  No American leader of 
either party could expect such a thing. 
If politicians face significant odds of being in the minority party, they may rationally try 
to reduce the variance to their political returns.  In part, they can do this by insulating the judicial 
system from political control.  Suppose, however, that by virtue of institutional design or some 
other means, the incumbent party has little control over judges and cannot rely on them to help 
win elections.  That party will be less likely to win the next election, but will also have a better 
chance to return to power later if it loses it.  American politicians seem to have chosen this 
option. 
LDP leaders had less reason to insulate their judges from election pressures.  Because 
they could realistically expect to stay in power indefinitely, they placed little value on being able 
to return to power more easily if they lost it. Consequently, they could rationally elect to monitor 
judges instead, and thereby obtain greater control over policy.  Although they increased the cost 
of losing an election, they accepted this, since they were less likely to lose. 
At stake is an intertemporal calculus.  American political leaders have increased their 
control over the future judiciary by reducing their control over the present one.  They freely 
make political appointments, routinely naming party loyalists.  By insulating these judges once 
appointed from political control, they increase the impact that these same appointments will have 
after they lose office.  By politicizing appointments but depoliticizing control, they augment their 
influence during periods when they are out of power.  All this, of  course, comes at the cost of 
decreasing their influence over policy while in power.  Because they must run the country with 
                                                           
20 Japanese incumbents face a higher risk of losing office than incumbents in either Britain, West Germany 
(as it was), or the United States.  See Calder (1988: 68). 
21 This conclusion is not affected by the LDP’s loss in the summer of 1993.  The point is not that the LDP 
had odds of winning of 100 percent every year.  Rather, the point is that its odds were extremely high.  Very few 
observers predicted the 1993 LDP loss, on the one hand; and on the other, it had some small  probability of losing 
previous elections too.    
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numerous independent judges appointed by their predecessors, they  necessarily have less impact 
over policy while in office.  
LDP politicians adopted the opposite tactic:  they increased their control over judges in 
the present by decreasing the extent to which that control lingers into the future.
22  By giving the 
party in power control over judges, they increased the electoral stakes.  As long as they stayed in 
power, they kept tight control over policy.  Once they lost an election, they sacrificed more 
power than a losing American party would sacrifice.  Because LDP leaders rationally expected 
not to lose, they rationally took the risk. 
The American equilibrium rests on nothing more than mutual cooperation.  American 
politicians do not adopt LDP tactics.  Yet they avoid them only by implicitly agreeing to use 
cooperative strategies in what they all recognize as a game that closely resembles an indefinitely 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Kreps, et al., 1982).  In such repeated games, however, implicit 
cooperation is fragile at best.  Parties to indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas do not 
necessarily cooperate.  At least theoretically, they may do anything at all (Rasmusen, 1989: 92; 
Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Buckley & Rasmusen, 2000).  They might agree to insulate their 
courts.  Then again, they might not. 
Yet one thing is certain, and that is that rational politicians will not cooperate if they 
cannot expect their rivals to do the same.  The battle over the 1801 Judiciary Act illustrates the 
problem.  Under the new Constitution, the transition in 1801 was the first.  At the time, the 
Federalists had no idea what shape a Republican government would take.  Given the French 
bloodbath and Jefferson’s Francophilia, they could easily fear the worst.  And even if Jefferson 
did not bring out the guillotine, the size of his victory, the extension of the franchise to poorer, 
non-Federalist voters, and the likely admission of new states in the non-Federalist West all 
portended a long period of Republican rule. Indeed, such a forecast would have been accurate; 
the Federalists disintegrated and the Republicans held the Presidency until they split into factions 
and a Whig won some forty years later.  In that world, to exercise self-restraint out of a hope that 
the Republicans might reciprocate struck many Federalists as insane.  Given that the Federalists 
showed no self-restraint, neither were the Republicans inclined to restrain themselves.  Only as 
the decades passed and the parties alternated in power regularly did cooperation (and greater 
judicial independence) eventually evolve. 
The contrast between the demise of the Federalists  and the later demise of the Whigs in 
America is instructive. The Whig Party disintegrated in the 1850’s because of the tension 
between its pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions, yet it did not try to interfere with judicial 
independence in its final years.  Partly this was because the most controversial issue before the 
courts, slavery,  was the one on which the leaders of the Whigs could not agree.  Partly, also, was 
that although the Whig Party disintegrated,  the Whig politicians themselves had a brighter 
future. They expected to continue in politics under some new party label, with a good chance of 
regaining power. And indeed what happened was that a coalition of ex-Whigs and dissatisfied 
Democrats formed an anti-slavery party, the Republican Party, which captured the Presidency 
within ten years.  
It is noteworthy that the greatest breakdown in the American consensus on the judiciary  
occurred when the two-party system was at its weakest.  This is shown not just by  the events of 
                                                           
22 Restated, American politicians politicize appointments but depoliticize control.  Japanese politicians 
politicize control and therefore need not politicize appointments as strongly.  A judge’s personal preferences do not 
matter as much if he can be deterred from excercising them or transferred if he does.    
  Page 20 
 
1801,  but by those of 1937.   The Democrats' smashing presidential and congressional victory of 
1936 was followed by Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court.  That he failed, at least in 
the court-packing plan itself, is less important than that he tried.     
Although two parties alternated in power in imperial Japan, by 1931 they also intervened 
in the courts.  Here, the explanation lies in the fear of a military takeover.  Parties to a repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma will often defect if they expect the game to end soon (Selten, 1978).  The 
higher the odds that it will end, the higher the odds they will defect.  By the late 1920s, few in 
Japan expected democracy to continue forever.  The military had almost entirely removed itself 
from civilian control.  Abroad, it was aggressively expanding onto the continent, conducting a 
foreign policy at odds with that of the elected government.  Domestically, it was beginning to 
threaten coups d’etat.  Democracy was on borrowed time, and anyone who followed Japanese 
politics knew it.  For just that reason, rational politicians increasingly adopted endgame tactics. 
If all this be true, then whether any coalition of rational voters will provide independent 
courts depends primarily on electoral probabilities.  At root, it involves three possibilities. 
 
1: Alternating-Party Regime.  
   Coalition X is in power but expects to alternate in power with Coalition Y indefinitely 
(the modern American parties).  The two coalitions may rationally have an understanding 
that whoever is in power will keep judges independent, but nothing in game theory says 
that is the only possible understanding.  Just as easily, it may be that the two coalitions 
engage in cutthroat competition with a politicized judiciary, to their mutual detriment but 
with no easy way out.    
 
 2: Dominant-Party Regime.   
   Coalition X is in power and expects to stay in power indefinitely (the postwar LDP).  
Coalition X may manipulate the courts.  Coalition X earns the greatest return from a 
hand-off-the-courts strategy if it expects to be out of power periodically.  If it does not 
expect to lose power, it has less incentive not to monitor and discipline its judges, both 
for reasons of pure politics and of efficient court administration. 
 
 3:  End-Period. 
   Coalition X is in power but fears it may lose power soon and will never regain it later, 
regardless of whether the judiciary remains independent after its defeat  (the prewar 
Japanese parties, or the American Federalists). Some other coalition Y-- the military in 
Japan, the Republicans in the United States--  is about to take its place indefinitely.    X 
has no reason to hold back from manipulating the courts to make the best of its present 
situation and perhaps delay its terminal loss of power.  
 
The idea behind the behavior we expect in all three regimes is that  sometimes inefficient 
behavior is the only equilibrium outcome in a repeated game with short-sighted players  but 
efficient behavior can be the outcome if players are far-sighted.   The LDP maintains courts with 
some independence because it wishes to maintain a reputation for keeping its commitments and 
for courts which will decide impartially between private parties regardless of their political clout. 
Keeping commitments and deciding impartially are efficient outcomes, given the goals of 
inducing people to rely on those commitments and to engage in business dealings in reliance on 
the law for such things as contract enforcement.  The LDP would acquire a short-term benefit   
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from bringing the judiciary until tight control, but it would sacrifice other benefits in future 
years. 
 Let us denote the value of the short-term benefit from interfering with the judiciary, as 
viewed from the present by the decisionmaker,  as S;  and the  long-term  cost as L. For 
independence to be an equilibrium requires that 
1.  L is  positive (nonindependence must have some cost). 
2.  L is large relative to S 
3.  The decisionmaker   has a long time horizon (long enough to make L large).  
 
Consider the sort of crude interference in the courts represented by the forced retirements 
in  prewar Japan.   For the LDP, with its professional politicians and sound prospects for staying 
in power,  the cost L   to this would be very large. For the political parties in imperial Japan in 
1931, with the threat of military takeover looming, L was not so large, and the more profitable 
course was to take the short-term benefit S.   
This depends completely  on L being large relative to S.  One thing L depends on is the 
time horizon used by the decisionmaker, but that is not the only thing.  Underlying the discussion 
of the previous paragraph was the assumption that L was positive—that there were indeed long-
term benefits from the decisionmaker holding back from seizing the short-term benefit S.   
Remember: the LDP did not allow its judges complete independence.  On certain kinds of 
issues— the constitutionality of the military, injunctions against the national government, and 
issues involving electioneering— we found that judges   deviated from the LDP line at their 
peril, even if no such peril seemed to exist for criminal or tax cases or for  injunctions against 
local governments.    Our explanation for this is that L is small or negative for the first set of 
issues and large for the second set.   The LDP would seem to derive no long-term benefit from 
being forced to adhere to the more impractical clauses of the constitution the American 
Occupation forces gave Japan some years before the LDP was formed, or from agreeing to let 
judges intervene in the executive branch by issuing injunctions against its decisions.  Nor, from 
the point of view of the LDP, was there any point to establishing a reputation for fair play against 
electoral rivals.   Those rivals were unlikely to ever be able to pay the LDP back in kind, 
especially if the LDP interfered with the rules of the game.  Thus, when it came to those issues, 
there was no tradeoff between the short run and the long run.  
Similar calculations are made by parties in an alternating-party regime, but the outcome 
is different.  There, the ruling party does have to worry about upsetting an implicit deal to not 
coerce judges. The result of upsetting the deal would be an equilibrium in which both parties 
rigged elections to give themselves an extra margin and in which statutory and constitutional 
interpretation flipped back and forth depending on who was in power. Quite possibly, this 
longterm loss L would outweigh the short-term advantage S, and the ruling party would adhere 
to the implicit deal.      
 
  Thus, the theory not only  predicts the degree of judicial independence, but what kinds of 
intervention will take place.   A longterm player, whether alternating  in power as in (1) or  
secure in power as in (2), would like to be able make commitments and monitor bureaucrats, as  
noted by Landes and Posner and McCubbins and Schwartz.  Where the two situations differ is in  
two respects. First, as mentioned above, a party that  alternates in power has less motivation for 
making the bureaucracy and court administration effective. Part of the benefit from that, after all, 
will go to the next party in power, helping that party carry out its policies.  Second,  a  party that   
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alternates in power cannot make as effective use of promotion policies.     If judges have posting 
of fixed terms,   the party may not be in power by the time an offending judge is up for his next 
posting. Even  if the party is in power at the right time, it only controls the postings while it is in 
power. When the other party comes to power, it can reverse any punishment or reward.     
Moreover, a party only temporarily in power will find it difficult to  delegate the implementation 
of judicial promotions to an administrative  secretariat.   There is a fixed cost to creating a loyal 
secretariat, and time is required to test the loyalty of its individual members.  The LDP    could 
foresee enough years in power for it to be worthwhile to shape a dependable secretariat and rely 
on it to keep the judiciary in line.  Any party that replaced the LDP would have to intervene more 
directly in the judiciary rather than delegating the task to experienced bureaucrats.  Thus, we 
predict that lack of an independent judiciary in regime (2) would manifest itself more in direct 
intervention by politicians—say, by firing judges outright—than by promotion policies. The 
same is true of regime (3), since that regime, too, has little time in which to influence the 
judiciary before it loses power.  
 
 
   
 
 
C.  Other Courts: European Courts, and State Courts in the United States 
 
 
  What  of  other court systems besides the three we have been discussing?  We can make 
predictions according to the theory,  even though testing them would require additional 
institutional and empirical investigation. 
   For bureaucratic court systems similar to Japan’s,  the outcome of   political influence via 
posting  should be the same as in Japan if, as in  Japan, the country’s ruling party expects to stay 
in power indefinitely.  Italy during the Christian Democrat years of the 1960’s and 1970’s is 
perhaps in this category.  In a country with the same court system but ruling parties that alternate 
in power, the prediction is weaker.  There, we would expect to see the cruder interventions of  
1920’s Japan, or   less effective use of judicial promotions and transfers.  Germany during the 
1950’s to 1980’s, when Social Democrats and Christian Democrats alternated in power, might fit 
this category.  In many countries the picture is further complicated by the frequency of coalition 
governments, which would to some extent differ as to what they wanted judges to do. Japan’s 
LDP is in some respects like a coalition, in that its factions compete against each other for 
influence, but the LDP factions do not differ much in policy preference—certainly not in their 
support for the Self-Defence Force or for laws that would keep make  electioneering difficult for 
minor parties, issues we have used in our regressions in this book.   
   Prediction becomes more difficult for systems that are neither like the Japanese system, 
with entry by examination, life tenure, and promotion by a secretariat, or   the U.S. federal 
system, with entry by political appointment, life tenure, and   little chance of promotion.  Most of 
the state courts in the United States fit neither category.  The United States has parallel court 
systems.  In each state there are federal courts to adjudicate federal laws and to adjudicate     
disputes between citizens of different states, but there are also state courts, to adjudicate state 
laws. The U.S. President appoints federal judges, with the consent of the U.S. Senate,  but he has 
no role in appointing state judges.  Rather,  each state decides its own method, and they have   
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chosen a wide variety of them.  Consider just   state supreme court judges (lower-court judges 
are often chosen differently).  The stage of initial selection includes partisan election, 
nonpartisan election (where the judges are not identified by party on the ballot), appointment by 
the governor (sometimes from a set of nominees by a committee of lawyers), and appointment by 
the legislature.  Once in office, their terms vary from 6 year to life.   In some states, to retain 
their jobs  judges must face  re-election or reappointment,  and in some  an appointed  judge must 
win a retention election in which voters vote for or against him  but without any other candidate 
on the ballot.  
     Why states have such a variety of features and terms of office is a fascinating question.   
Even the   theoretical predictions of our repeated-game model for which states will choose which 
methods are somewhat unclear. For one thing, a distinction needs to be made between selection 
and retention.  It is often said that elected state judges are not independent because they owe their 
position to the voters.   Being elected by the voters directly, however, makes a judge no less 
independent than does appointment by the President. In both cases, the judge is not chosen 
randomly or by passing an examination: someone has done the selecting on the basis of both the 
judge’s views and his abilities.  Once selected, the judge does not lack independence merely 
because someone else chose him.  Even if he made campaign promises, those are no binding.  
        Rather, what matters to judicial independence is what happens to someone currently a judge 
in the future.  If the President could refuse to renew a judge at the end of a ten-year term, that 
would limit the judge’s independence. Similarly, if the electorate can refuse to re-elect a judge at 
the end of  a ten-year term, that limits the judge’s independence.  If, on the other hand, the judge 
is restricted by law to one term, that judge will be independent—he has nothing to lose by 
making controversial decisions.  
          What matters, then, is the length of a judge’s term in a particular post, his promotion 
possibilities, and what determines whether he retains his post for a succeeding term.  It is not that 
elected judges are less independent, but that re-elected judges must worry about their futures.  
An effective way to insulate judges from outside influence would be to pass term limits 
forbidding them to be reappointed or re-elected, but no state has done this.  
     We   need to make somewhat finer distinctions in institutions once  the  different systems 
used in the U.S. state courts are to be considered. First, independent judges are not the same as 
an independent judiciary.  Suppose judges are limited  to a single  nonrenewable two-year term, 
after which     new judges are elected.   Those judges will be independent, but if the voters want 
to use the judiciary to reverse a law, they can do so within two years  by electing   new judges 
chosen for their desires, independent of personal gain, to reverse the law.  The judges are 
independent, but not the judiciary, and such a judiciary will not serve the purpose  of 
commitment to government promises suggested by Landes and Posner.     
        Another difficulty for fitting the different states’ methods into our theory is that once 
judges may be directly elected, we must distinguish  between independence from the politicians 
and from the voters.    In our earlier analysis this did not matter.  The LDP was the majority party 
because it advocated the policies supported by a majority of the voters,  so the voters and the 
LDP would have the same preferences about  judicial behavior. This would even extend to 
wishing judges to make electioneering difficult for  minor parties and to not minding judicial 
injunctions against locally elected politicians.   Voters from the minor parties are a minority, and  
often the enjoined local politicians are from places with minority preferences— the mayor of a 
Socialist town in an LDP nation.  Similarly, in the United States when the President appoints and 
the Senate confirms judges, they are reflecting the desires of their constituents.    
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         There is a difference, however, between electing a governor who appoints judges, the 
system in some states, and electing a governor and judges in the same election but by checking 
different boxes on a ballot.  When judges are appointed,  the voter must make a bundled choice: 
he cannot vote for the Republican governor and the Democrat judge.  The same goes for 
retention. If the governor  has the power to reappoint a judge or not,  then the voters have 
bundled that power together with other gubernatorial powers,  and in voting for a judge are also 
voting for retaining judges based on how much they please the governor.  
        What determines how a state bundles the voters’ choice possibilities?   This  of course   
applies more widely than just to judges and governors.  A democracy could vote for just one 
executive, who would appoint everyone else in the executive branch, or it could vote for every 
employee separately, all the way down to whoever takes out the trash.   The basic tradeoff is 
between minimizing the  information the voter needs to decide how to vote, which is done by 
having fewer elected offices, and   reducing the power of the executive, which is done by having 
more elected offices.    
           Voters would like the executive to have more power if he will use it to carry out the 
policies for which they elect him.  They face  the problem, however, that once elected he may 
use the power for personal ends—such things as acquiring wealth,  helping friends, or  insulating 
hiimself from the possibility of electoral defeat.    Unbundling power helps solve that problem by 
diversifying the voters’ portfolio of policy providers, and by introducing   “checks and balances”  
-- the ability of different officials to monitor each other without fear of being fired and in some 
cases the need for several to agree before new laws can be promulgated.    Thus, having judges 
elected separately from governors means that if the governor fails to carry out the laws which  he 
passes, the judges can force him to do so, and if he embezzles from the state treasury and shows 
up in court, he will be convicted.  
       F. Andrew Hanssen (2001) has made an admirable start at untangling the institutional 
structure of the state courts.  Using regression methods, he finds that partisan elections  are 
associated with the strength of the ruling party.   The “merit plan”, in which   politicians  (usually 
the governor) appoint  judges from a list compiled by a  nonpartisan nominating commission and 
the judge keeps his job if he wins an uncontested retention election, is inversely associated with 
the strength of the ruling party.  These results accord with the repeated-game theory.   Focus on 
the retention method in each case. The futures of judges who must face the voters in partisan 
elections are certainly dependent on the voters, but they are also dependent on the politicians 
who influence party endorsements, so  partisan elections make for less independent judges.   
Judges under the merit plan are more independent. They must win appointment by finding favor 
from the nominating commission and the politician who makes the  actual appointment, to be 
sure, but what matters more is the retention method.  Since it is a  nonpartisan election, without 
opposing candidates, it is very difficult to unseat such a judge, and politicians cannot intervene in 
the election by promoting rival candidates or withholding endorsements.  Thus, Hanssen’s results 
support the theory that where rival parties alternate in power they agree to insulate the  judiciary 
from  pressure by whichever party happens to be in power.  
    Why are U.S. federal judges appointed for life terms rather than having to face retention 
elections?   Part of the answer is historical;   for whatever reason, amending the U.S. Constitution 
has been much more difficult than amending state constitutions,  so unless  the voters thought 
retention elections were clearly superior, it would  not be worth the cost of changing the 
institution. More practically, however,  one of the main functions of the federal court system is to 
protect federal interests from state interference.   If  U.S. district judges were subject to retention   
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votes from the people of their districts, it would be hard for them to make rulings that were in 
accord with the  national majority of voters  but opposed by the local district majority.  It would 
be impractical, however, to hold retention elections in which every citizen of the United States 
voted for every judge.  Only at the Supreme Court level would such a system   potentially be 
useful.  
  
    
 
V. Judges  and  Bureaucrats 
Our second comparative puzzle is why judges are treated differently from other 
bureaucrats.  Most government employees are in situations more like imperial Japan than either 
modern Japan or the United States.  They are subject to the direct commands of the politicians, 
who can order them to change their decisions in particular cases.   And the politician can control 
promotion.  The bureaucrats may, of course, object that the politicians’ orders are illegal, but 
their recourse is the same as that of any citizen: to go to the courts.  The politicians are, after all, 
their bosses.  
In modern Japan, the bureaucracy contains a  large  fast-track made up of bureaucrats 
with career tracks very similar to those of judges.  The Level 1 Entrance Examination for the 
National Civil Service is ordinarily taken by  students in their last year of college.  In 1993, of 
35,887 test-takers, 1,863 passed, a rate of 5.2 percent (Ikuta: 36).    There were  1,012  entry  
positions, and the bureaus had already decided on many of the students they wanted, based on 
college performance, even before they passed the exam.  Like judges, the successful test-takers 
are disproportionately from Tokyo and Kyoto Universities, and the Tokyo undergraduate 
program in law is particularly known as the place to be for a student aspiring to be an elite 
bureaucrat.  Once the new graduate succeeds in getting a job, he ordinarily stays in one ministry 
for his entire career.  Non-elite bureaucrats and those hired for their technical skills are regularly 
evaluated in compliance with National Personnel Authority Rule 10-2 if they are at or below the 
rank of division director, but the fast-trackers are subject only to informal, unwritten evaluation 
(Ikuta: 57).  The successful young bureaucrat will rise from  Officer to Senior Officer to  Unit 
Chief to Assistant Director to Division Director, Deputy Director-General, Director-General, and  
Administrative Vice-Minister.  Most will not make it to the pinnacle of Administrative Vice-
Minister, and most will retire around age 55 to take jobs in the private sector or quasi-
government agencies, a stage of life known as “descending from heaven” (amakudari).  Like 
judges, elite bureaucrats are well paid— a director-general earns   1,230,000 yen  per year (about 
$100,000)—but not nearly as well paid as their peers who went into the private sector out  of 
college.
23   
Thus, elite bureaucrats are much the same kind of people as elite judges--- and they are 
more than  a cut above the ordinary Japanese politician in their educational background and 
intellectual ability.   Some observers conclude that they are out of the control of the politicians, 
                                                           
23 Ikuta (1995) is a good general guide to the civil service, as written by an experienced Japanese journalist. The  
National Personnel Authority’s website,  “Introduction to the Japanese Civil Service System,”   
http://www.jinji.admix.go.jp/english/intro.htm (July 10, 2001),  in both English and Japanese,  provides details of 
procedures, ranks, and salaries, as well as data on such things as age at separation from the civil service.  Two other 
entertaining sources of anecdotes are Jacob Schlesinger’s 1997 Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s 
Postwar Machine, which  centers on politicians, and  Masao Miyamoto’s  rather naïve  1994 book,  Straightjacket 
Society: An Insider’s Irreverent View of Bureaucratic Japan.  
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and that the bureaucrats are who really controls government policy in Japan.    In an earlier 
chapter we quoted Chalmers Johnson, who said in what is the leading study of any  Japanese 
ministry  that the bureaucrats  in the  Ministry of International Trade & Industry  “make most 
major decisions, draft virtually all legislation, control the national budget, and [are] the source of 
all major policy innovations in the system” (1982: 20-21).   James Q. Wilson said that, “in Japan, 
the bureaucracy is the government” (1989: 308).  Tadehide Ikuta notes that ministers  rarely if 
ever reject promotions put forward by the ministry officials, and concludes that: “The cabinet is 
practically a rubberstamp for nominees appointed by an agency's  bureaucrats”  (1995:  12).     
Karel van Wolferen admits that the politician has some leverage, but denies that it has any 
impact:  
 
  “Even if a minister uses all his remaining powers, it will not enable him in practice to redirect 
Japanese policy in any noticeable manner.  A minister may have influence over a ministry in the sense 
that he can promote or fire officials, and exert leverage in the allocation of resources to benefit his 
supporters and constituency.  But this is different from wielding strong political power over a 
bureaucracy.   Except when it  is part of a longstanding campaign to assert control over education, for 
example, a minister’s `policy-making’ is generally too limited to deserve the name at all” (1989: 190). 
 
Looking more closely, though, one sees that bureaucrats do seem to be responsive to the 
desires of politicians.  We have mentioned that Ramseyer and Rosenbluth   (1997: ch.  7)  show 
that bureaucratic policymaking  promotes the electoral objectives of the LDP;  that  McCubbins 
and   Thies (1997) find that even shifts in the power of the different factions within the LDP 
result in changes in budget priorities; and that McCubbins and Noble (1995) show that the LDP 
keeps tabs on the political implications of what bureaucrats do and takes care to control the  
policy  agenda.    Yung Chul Park (1986: 61-77)  explains in detail how  politicians, particularly 
those in the LDP party committees (“tribes”)  created to monitor individual ministries,   intervene 
in personnel policies, in particular.  
Even writers who repeat the conventional wisdom that the bureaucrats are independent  
give evidence that this is not so.  Van Wolferen tells us that     Construction Ministry officials 
spend much of their time talking with politicians who want roads and such projects in their 
districts; that LDP member who intervene on behalf of city or prefectural governments for   
nationally-funded projects routinely are kicked back  two percent of the project’s value;  and that 
the Tanaka political machine was  able to leverage its commission for building contracts or 
regulatory changes to three percent of the value (1989: 151, 177).   The politician may not even 
need to ask.  Shortly after Takeshita became prime minister,  almost all the building requests 
from his home  prefecture of  Shimane   won approval, which is highly unusual. The governor of 
Shimane thanked the Construction Ministry for what he called a “congratulatory gift” to the new 
prime minister (1989: 156).  
Ikuta recounts similar stories in his book on Japanese officialdom.   Allowing contractors 
about to bid on a public project  to meet and decide who will get which parts of the project and at 
what price (a practice so common it has its own name: dango), would seem to be  contrary to the 
Antimonopoly Act, and, indeed, to be simple fraud.   But high profits on construction projects 
are highly useful to politicians so long as contractors are appropriately grateful, and so 
prosecutors and the Fair Trade Commission rarely crack down (1995: 168).   Legislation is 
indeed written by bureaucrats,  proposed by the ministries, and  is routinely passed by the Diet, 
but even after it has been modified within its originating ministry it  must pass through the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and  “No agency reportedly has ever had a Cabinet order proposal   
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forwarded to a Cabinet meeting in its original form” (1995; 75).    Pressure on the bureaucracy 
can even lead to suicide. After a high official in the Environment Agency committed suicide in 
1990, an LDP Diet member said, “Mr. Yamauchi seemed fine; he smiled a lot. But the LDP was 
cruel to him; the party never listened to him yet made demand after demand while he was trying 
to give serious thought to the issues” (1995: 75).  
Chapters 6 and 7 of Ramseyer and Rosenbluth collect a large number of similar 
anecdotes, from their own experience and from other works, as well as  general analysis of how 
Japanese politicians control bureaucracies.     One new agriculture minister started by saying in a 
speech to his bureaucrats, “It is said that art is long and life is short. You must think that 
‘agriculture lasts long and the minister’s life is short.’  You fellows don’t last long either. My 
term is at most one year, but I can fire you through evaluations of your work performance. The 
truth is that ‘agriculture  is long and the bureaucrat’s life is short’ “ (Park, 1986: 66 as cited in  
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1997: 111).  A MITI bureaucrat said, when asked why his ministry 
drafted futile statutes  relaxing anti-collusion laws to rescue a textile  industry doomed by   
international competition, “We know the industry won’t last. We’ve known that for years.  But in 
the meantime these textile firms use people who vote LDP. The party’s got to be able to show  
them that it cares. So we do our part.  We give the politicians a new statute to show the textile 
people every year” (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1997: 121).   MITI  drafted   the Large Stores Act 
in 1973, which authorized regulation  to encourage the appropriate development of  the retail 
industry, paying attention to the protection of consumer interests  and guaranteeing the business 
opportunities of smaller retailers. 
24  After earlier regulation failed to do the trick, it   came up 
with regulations that effectively required supermarkets to buy out the local retailers before they 
started building, reducing supermarket construction from 576 to 125 during the four years after 
1979 (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth: 1997:129-30).  Small business support of the LDP was likely not 
coincidental;  lack of protection of consumer interests was tangential.  Ministry of Finance 
officials have been trying to consolidate the banking industry ever since the American 
Occupation, proposing statutes and engaging in jawboning to try to   ease out the smaller and 
weaker banks that are most likely to cause headaches for regulators.  They have consistently 
failed  to get their bills passed, and the targeted banks, supporters of and supported by the LDP, 
found little to worry about. (Rosenbluth, 1989, summarized in Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1997: 
126).   
  There are also stories of   crackdowns on bureaucrats   with the same flavor as   those 
we related in Chapter 1 about judges.  In 1953, shortly after the American Occupation ended,  
Shigeo Odachi, mayor of Singapore during the Japanese Occupation, became Education 
Minister.  He brought along a number of   officials from  the pre-war bureaucracy who had been 
purged by the Americans, and a number of   Education officials resigned in protest (van 
Wolferen: 101).  In1962, Ichiro Kono became Minister of Construction. Saying that    “there 
were no qualified personnel within the Ministry of Construction to choose from,” he exercised 
his undoubted right to choose his own top officials and brought some in from the National Police 
Agency.  He reportedly told Construction officials, “I don't give a damn what you have done 
before I came here. Stay if you want to work with me. Leave if you do not want to cooperate or 
are not competent for the job,”  provoking resignations (Ikuta: 107).  
                                                           
24 Daikibo kouritenpo ni okeru kourigyo no jigyo katsudo no chosei ni  kansuru horitsu (Law Concerning the 
Adjustment of Retail Business Operations in Large Retail Stores), Law NO. 109 of 1973.  xxxx Mark, do you know 
how to add overlines for long vowels in Word?  
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Are these anecdotes   special cases in certain ministries, or are they just the tip of an 
iceberg of bureaucratic subservience?  It  would perhaps be more persuasive if we used   our 
regression method to look at the relation between bureaucratic decisions and bureaucratic careers 
in the same way    we did for judges.    An effort to use statistical analysis would face a perhaps 
insurmountable problem, however.  Judicial decisions are a very special sort of bureaucratic 
decision:  public, sharp, attributable to  a single panel of judges,   and not circulated for comment 
before they are made.    The end-product of other bureaucratic decisionmaking can be equally 
sharp and public—the road is built in Shimane or it is not--  but it is much harder for an outsider   
to know whether a bureaucrat’s initial decision was reversed within the organization by other   
bureaucrats or politicians and to determine who is responsible for the ultimate decision. In the 
end, the voters   say the politician is responsible.   Thus, we will be content here to rely on the 
previous work for the premise that bureaucrats are not only not independent, but   less 
independent than judges in modern Japan.
25  
  Studies of U.S bureaucrats, notably  Calvert,  Moran, and   Weingast (1987)  have 
shown them to be similarly responsive to politicians.
26    Granted, the top politicians rarely 
intervene in the bureaus directly.  The general pattern is that the President (or Governor) appoints 
heads of bureaus and one or two layers of subordinates from outside the career bureaucracy, but 
the vast majority of the personnel are civil service employees, immune from firing for political 
reasons.  Congress and the state legislatures have even less control, merely setting budgets and  
with the right, at most, to embarrass bureaucrats with public questioning.   Yet the bureaucrats 
seem responsive not just to the President, but to Congress as well, an intricate dance when 
President and Congressmen are of different parties.  
The reason for the combination of lack of firings or commands and bureaucratic 
responsiveness in the U.S. follows the Remains of the Day logic of butler and master described 
in Chapter 1:  politicians do not need to intervene if the bureaucrats anticipate what they want.  
Knowing that politicians can intervene if necessary with outright reversal,  reduced budgets, 
unpleasant job assignments, or even firings in extreme cases,  bureaucrats administer according 
to the political preferences of the party in power -- and the politicians have no reason to  
  Imperial Japan’s bureaucracy has received far less attention from scholars and popular 
                                                           
25 It is perhaps worth mentioning one class of anecdote that seems to illustrate bureaucratic independence: 
the bureaucrat  public prosecutors who pursue corruption cases against politicians.  The most famous of these, the 
prosecution of former Prime Minister Tanaka for bribery by Lockheed,  illustrates when  prosecutors are likely to 
bring these cases.   As Ikuta explains it (1995: 124-27), at the time of the arrest in 1976,  Tanaka’s rival within the 
LDP, Takeo Miki, was Prime Minister, and the Justice Minister was Osamu Inaba, of the rival Nakasone faction.  
Moreover, the Justice Department was having a hard time attracting recruits.     In 1975, only 38 LRTI graduates had 
even applied for jobs as prosecutors, while the bureau considered 50 the minimum it needed  to hire.  In 1976, 
prosecutorial glamour having been restored,     the number of applicants rose to 74. This illustrates two points: that 
the bureaucrats can sometimes do better by antagonizing current politicians than by supporting them, and  that the 
incumbent party is not monolithic, but    a coalition of politicians with often-diverging  interests. As a postscript:  
Tanaka and his friends were more careful in who became Justice Minister over the next few years,  new Justice 
Ministers and chief prosecutors belittled corruption probes, and  between 1976 and 1992 not a single Diet member 
was arrested for corruption.  
26     The empirical evidence is overwhelming:  a few of the many studies include Calvert, Moran & 
Weingast (1987), which looks at the response of American bureaucrats’ behavior to changes in which politicians run 
the relevant Congressional committees, is just one of many empirical studies that confirm the responsiveness of the 
bureaucracy to the politicians.   Others include Bagnoli & McKee (1991); Coate, Higgins & McChesney (1990); 
Weingast & Moran (1983).   
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writers than that of  either modern Japan or the United States, but  it requires discussion   
especially given that the Meiji oligarchs’ theory of  “transcendental government”  meant to keep 
the executive branch, including  the bureaucrats, independent of the politicians.   
By the 1920's not only did the politicians control the Cabinet: they controlled the bureaus.  
Table 7-3 illustrates the ties between staff turnover and political control in two areas of the 
bureaucracy.  Take Table 7-3A:  changes in personnel at the Ministry of Home Affairs at the 
posts of section chief or higher each year.  During the five years when the party controlling the 
Cabinet changed, an average of 79.4 people changed office.  In the six years when the party did 
not change, an average of 35.2 people changed office.  Whenever a Cabinet succeeded a rival 
party Cabinet, mid- and senior-level turnover doubled. 
Similarly, take Table 7-3B:  changes in the governorships.  These posts too were under 
the Ministry of Home Affairs.  On the two occasions when a Cabinet succeeded another Cabinet 
from the same party, the new Cabinet replaced almost no governors.  When a Cabinet succeeded 
a rival party Cabinet, it immediately replaced almost all the governors. 
 
Table 7-3:  Personnel Changes in the Ministry of Home Affairs 
 
 
A.  Mid- and Senior-Level Personnel Turnover 
 
Year   Cabinet Shift  Turnover 
1921  S to S  13 
1922  S to N  51* 
1923  N to N  48 
1924   N to N and N to K   80* 
1925   None   38 
1926   K to K   46 
1927   K to S   73* 
1928   None   39 
1929   S to M   77* 
1930   None  27 
1931   M to S  116* 
 
 
B.  Governorship Turnover  (out of 45 governors) 
 
Cabinet Date  Prime Minister   Party   Turnover 
June 11, 1924  Kato   K  27*  
June 30, 1926   Wakatsuki   K   0  
April 20, 1927   Tanaka   S   40*  
July 2, 1929   Hamaguchi   M   35*  
April 14, 1931   Wakatsuki   M   6  
December 13, 1931   Inukai   S   41*    
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     Notes:    S is a Seiyukai Cabinet, N is a nonparty Cabinet, K is 
a Kenseikai Cabinet, and M is a Minseito Cabinet.  Asterisks follow 
the numbers associated with changes in party.  
 
       In Panel A,  turnover  is  the number of changes   at the level 
of section chief (kacho) or higher during the calendar year.  
     In panel B,    turnover  is the number of new governors appointed 
within one month after the change in Cabinet. 
 
     Source:  Calculated from data found in Ikuhiko Hata, Senzenki 
Nihon kanryosei no seido, soshiki, jinji [The system, organization, 






These data raise a further puzzle:  why did the prewar Japanese politicians manipulate the 
bureaus earlier and more aggressively than the courts?  The answer probably lies in electoral 
advantage.  By the 1920s, party politicians realized that they were in an endgame and abandoned 
any cooperative strategies they might have played.  Once they had decided to renege, however, 
they had to decide where to focus their resources.  In order to decide what to manipulate to 
maximize their reelection chances, prewar politicians had first to decide which institutions would 
have the most immediate electoral effect.  
In imperial Japan, the bureau with the most immediate electoral implications was the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.  The Home Ministry, not the Justice Ministry, controlled the police, 
and the police supervised electoral campaigns.  Through the police, the party in power could 
harass its opponents.  Five days before the 1928 general election, the police had already filed 
electoral law charges against 638 people, and almost all were opposition party supporters (Tokyo 
Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 15, 1928).  “The police only reported the actions of the parties out of 
power,” one-time prime minister Takashi Hara (1965: 93; entry for 3/28/15) once observed.  
They largely “left the government party alone to do as it pleased.”  
Even if courts mattered in elections, they mattered less directly.  As a result, party 
politicians did not begin to manipulate them until they had learned how to manipulate the more 
immediately relevant institutions.  They had, after all, only recently taken control of the 
government.  Before they could manipulate any government institution, they needed first to learn 
how it worked.  Accordingly, they focused their resources first on the institutions with the 
greatest electoral impact.  They turned to courts only later. 
 
So it seems that in all three regimes we have been discussing,  imperial Japan, modern 
Japan, and the United States,  politicians control bureaucrats, even though the degree of judicial 
independence varied among the three regimes.   Why would politicians in modern Japan and the 
United States wish to maintain institutions that control  bureaucrats more tightly than judges?    
Above, we argued that in modern Japan the LDP gave considerable (if not complete) 
independence to judges to better provide voters with commitments to carry out the policies for   
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which they were elected, intervening only indirectly via promotions and transfers, and then only 
after judges made decisions in certain categories of particular interest to the LDP politicians. For 
an alternating-party regime such as the United States, we argued that the two parties would like 
to adhere to an equilibrium in which the party in power refrains from changing the institutions of 
the judiciary to reduce its independence because it fears that if it does so, the rival party will use 
the judiciary against it when   it next wins an election. But why not apply this logic to the 
bureaucracy too? Why wouldn’t a loose rein (though not a nonexistent one)  be better for 
inducing the bureaucracy to deliver the services voters want in  Japan, and why in the United 
States  does the party currently in power not fear that if it tells the bureaucrats what to do, the 
rival party will later do the same?   
 
 
Return to our theory of judicial independence.  It relies upon the short-term benefit S of 
political interference being less than the long-term cost L.  There is certainly  a short-term 
advantage S to the ruling party from controlling the bureaucrats.  But is there a long-term cost L 
to  depriving them of  independence?    
 For judges, the two leading theories are the Landes-Posner theory of judges as promise-
enforcers and the McCubbins-Schwartz theory of judges as bureaucrat-monitors.  Neither of 
these applies to the bureaucracy.  If there were no  independent judiciary, the Landes-Posner 
theory would say that it would be desirable to have independent bureaucrats to enforce promises. 
But if a group of bureaucrats were carved off and given independence   for this purpose, we 
would in effect have created an independent judiciary.  The McCubbins-Schwartz theory applies 
even less. If bureaucrats are made independent, then nobody is monitoring them, so that cannot 
be the purpose of their independence.  Both theories suggest that a nation starting with a non-
independent bureaucracy would like to carve off a certain part of it and make it into an 
independent judiciary,  but neither suggests that the whole bureaucracy need be independent.  
     There exist, moreover, the straightforward reasons for keeping bureaucrats under the 
control of politicians that made it necessary to explain the independence of the judiciary in the 
first place.  The voters elect politicians as their agents to produce new policies and administer   
existing government services.  Independent bureaucrats would thwart this in two ways. First, 
they could substitute their personal policy preferences for those of the voters.  Without the power 
to control the bureaucracy, the politicians could not control policy either.   Second, the 
bureaucrats would lack incentives to administer either new or old policies effectively.  Without 
the  threat  of personnel policy, why should a bureaucrat work hard?  One might reply that 
someone controls promotions even in an independent bureaucracy, and   merit would still be 
rewarded. But this  logic has the flaw that the top bureaucrat lacks external incentives to take his 
monitoring responsibilities seriously  It also  takes us back to the first problem:  the lower 
bureaucrats would be responsive to the top bureaucrats, not the voters,  to the extent that they did 
exert effort on the job.   
In contrast, there are good reason to keep  bureaucrats under the control of the politicians.   
Any organization which people enter at a young age and remain in for most of their life will want 
to use promotions as a means of staffing high-level positions and of rewarding good performance 
in low-level positions   Thus, to make the bureaucracy as free from political interference as the 
American judiciary would dramatically hamper its effectiveness.  .  But if promotions can occur, 
it must be at someone's discretion, and if anyone is to control the staff who carry out policy, why 
not the politicians? In a democracy they are accountable to those whom the policies are supposed   
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to benefit, the  voters, and so have incentive to work hard to make the organization effective at 
delivering services and legislation.   
Even aside from the promise-enforcing and bureaucrat-monitoring functions of judges, 
the  type  of work that bureaucrats do makes direct control of them more important  for everyday 
administrative efficiency.   Bureaucrats make closed-door decisions with diffuse responsibility, 
whereas judges make public decisions attributable at least to a three-judge panel rather than to  a 
ministry.   A distant observer can detect misbehavior in a  court proceeding, whereas detecting 
bureaucratic misbehavior requires observing the decision process as it unfolds behind  the 
ministry doors.   Bureaucratic decisionmaking is an example of the “teams” problem studied by 
Holmstrom (1982), in which individual efforts generate a group output and  individual members 
can hide their shirking.  
Bureaucrats also spend much of their time on simple administrative tasks, whereas 
judicial work is more technical. This means that the politician can better monitor bureaucrats if 
he is on the spot, even though more distant observation  may   have trouble allocating 
responsibility.  He can tell if a memo briefing him for a conference is late or ill-written; he 
cannot tell whether a judicial opinion  has failed to take into account everything it should. This 
reason applies more to low-level government employees than to Level I Examination elite 
bureaucrats, but the quality of even what high-level bureaucrats do is often easily observable, 
whereas even everyday court decisions are  hard to make (after all, if the law and facts were 
clear, the parties would have settled out of court).  
Perhaps the most important difference between what judges do and what other officials 
do is that the task of carrying out policies requires effort, whereas judges do not have to exert 
any more effort to carry out a policy than to block it—perhaps less, since blocking a policy 
usually requires more explanation.   Since the bureaucrats must be made to exert effort,  they 
must be given stronger incentives than judges to do their work.  
   
This does raise the question, though, of whether it matters whether the politicians have 
the authority to reverse decisions and use personnel policy to punish bureaucrats.  The politicians 
are outnumbered: there are far more unelected officials than elected officials. Moreover, most of 
the elected officials are in the legislative branch and in no position to exercise day-to-day 
authority even if they had it.  It is no wonder that bureaucrats draft most legislation and make 
most decisions; the politicians are too few in number to physically do the job.  And, as 
mentioned earlier,  some may wonder if the politicians are up to the job mentally either:  it is  the 
bureaucrats who are the Tokyo University graduates, while the politicians, unless they are former 
bureaucrats, were more likely to have been in the 95 percent that failed the Level I Examination 
if they had bothered to take it at all.    
The answer, of course, is that the politicians rely on a random sampling of decisions 
made by the bureaucrats, and their evaluation is based on results, which are generally simpler to 
evaluate than methods.    Like the executives in large corporations, they set policy goals and then 
delegate authority to subordinates, often more technically adept,  whose future careers are under 
their control.  Chapter 6 of  Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1997) details the way that this is done in 
Japan—a method whose sophistication was raised to its highest level by Prime Minister Tanaka, 
a high-school dropout widely known for his ability to get things through the bureaucracy. As 
Tanaka put it,  “Government officials are human computers; politicians set directions for them. 
... At first you fight with the official, who typically responds with `Why should I listen to you?' 
You then tell the official, It's government by party rule. When you become director-general, you   
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will  have use for me.' The official then will think about it, and come to his senses. The official 
will then come to you” (Ikuta, 1995: 109). 
  The politician  needs two things to run a bureaucracy:  incentives for the bureaucrat, and 
information on what the bureaucrat is doing.  Career advancement  and bureau budgets provide 
the typical incentives. In Japan,  “descent from heaven” jobs provide another incentive. 
Typically, observers see these jobs as putting the bureaucracy under the control of the private 
sector. This neglects the fact that  much of the usefulness of    ex-bureaucrats  derives from their 
contacts with their old bureau and the politicians who oversee it.   If they have pleased the 
politicians, they will have good contacts and be helpful to their new employer; if they have 
displeased the politicians, it will be safer not to hire them—at least in a country like Japan, where 
the offended party  will continue to be in power.    This is of course even more true if the post-
retirement job is in a quasi-governmental organization or is election to the Diet—a not 
uncommon second career for elite bureaucrats.
27  
 As Ramseyer and Rosenbluth explain, the ex-bureaucrats in the Diet—and the current 
bureaucrats who are looking to  promotion or good post-retirement jobs—also help the   less 
experienced  politicians  acquire the information they need to monitor the bureaucracy.     
Information is a valuable commodity in bureaucracies, and if the politician has something with 
which to buy it—favor and promotions--  he will find bureaucrats willing to sell it.  The 
transactions are not so  crude, of course, but where gains from trade exist, we would expect trade 
to occur.  
Even without information about bureaucratic disobedience being volunteered by other 
bureaucrats eager to please, however, the politician would not be totally in the dark.   Hierarchies 
are set up in organizations so that the leader can limit   his personal effort to monitoring his 
immediate subordinates. In this case, the politician can delegate monitoring to his immediate 
subordinates in the bureaucracy, letting them know what kinds of policies he wants to see, or 
even relying on their experience in knowing what politicians want.  They, in turn, delegate 
monitoring to their own subordinates, using their own influence over promotions.  For the 
politician, such a strategy is particularly feasible because it is the top bureaucrats whose 
promotions he can most easily influence and who, being older, are nearing the time when they 
hope to move into their  high-profile  post-retirement jobs.   
Yet another source of information for the politician in charge of the bureau, and a very 
important one, is complaints from other politicians or   voters.   McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) 
explain how drastically this reduces the need for direct monitoring. Rather than examine every 
decision the bureaucrats make, the politician can wait for complaints from people whose interests 
he shares—his voters and politicians from his party.   This is how even junior politicians outside 
a ministry also have influence.  If the bureaucrat rejects the junior politician’s request, he can 
appeal to the senior politician with formal authority over the bureaucrat, who will then 
investigate the decision.   In modern Japan, the LDP’s party oversight committees exist to aid 
this process.  Backbenchers join committees that watch individual ministries carefully.  If the 
backbenchers are unhappy with the shape legislation is taking, they can let the Minister and  
Prime Minister know.   If all the politicians are in agreement, the bureaucrats responsible can be 
                                                           
27  An exception that proves the rule is the difficulty the Socialists had in their 9-month-long administration in 1947.   
Ministry of Finance official  Takeo Fukuda  could not  find the funds for a sensitive program for the Socialists,  but 
was more successful a few months later   for the conservative government that succeeded them.   He later resigned 
to become a leading LDP politician   (Van Wolferen, 1989:  189).   A government duraion known to be short will 
have    difficulty in using bureaucrats for partisan purposes.  
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directed to change what they are doing.  Otherwise,  the discussion becomes an element in the 
intricate process by which backbenchers choose  prime ministers and prime ministers choose 
ministers.  
Thus, it is both desirable and feasible for politicians to control bureaucrats,  and if their 
control is tight enough, we will never observe bureaucrats doing anything the politicians do not 
want.   Indeed, we will often see the bureaucrats anticipating the desires of the politicians, 
making proposals that the politicians like but would never have thought of on their own.    Such 
bureaucratic initiative is a sign of effective control, not lack of control.  It is only when 
bureaucrats are unsure of what politicians want (as in transitions from one party to another, when 
the party changes policies suddenly, or when there is intra-party dissension)   that we will 
observe bureaucrats making decisions  the majority party does not want.   The bureaucrats will 
be accountable to the politicians, and the politicians will be accountable to the voters.
28  
 
 An alternative institution to attain this end   would be to elect the bureaucrats, which 
would seem to retain accountability to the voter and   make it more direct.  Why have any 
middleman between the voter and his public servant?  We earlier discussed unbundling the 
electoral package of governor and supreme court judges in U.S. states. Why not unbundled  the 
package of governor and administrators, voting separately for each office, all the way down to 
the janitor who cleans the governor’s office? This seems absurd—and it is absurd, but why?  The 
response that immediately comes to mind—that there is a practical difficulty in voting for 
hundreds of offices—is not the main problem.  It is not hard to set up a voting machine so that 
voters can vote for a straight party ticket with the exception of particular offices they care about.  
This saves the typical voter from having to puzzle over who to support for local coroner or state 
comptroller. It also points to one big problem with voting for minor officials:  the swing votes 
will come from those voters who take a special interest in that official, and those are going to be 
the ones whose interests he affects.  In such a situation, we would expect the good of the average 
voter to be sacrificed to the good of the informed voter.
29    
Another reason to package governor and lower official together is to avoid divided 
responsibility.   If  they are elected separately, then after a project fails the governor can point the 
voters towards the official, while the official will suggest that the governor is to blame.  Since 
voters will suspect both, they both will share the penalty, and this gives neither one the efficient 
incentive to put forth his best effort.  This is another example of the “teams” problem alluded to 
earlier in this chapter (Holmstrom, 1982).  If, on  the other hand, only  the governor is elected 
and the bureaucracy is not independent,   the voters will always blame the governor:  either he 
made the mistake himself, or he failed by not properly controlling the lower official.    
Both of these reasons point to a paradox: when too many officials are accountable at the 
                                                           
28 For a book-length treatment of  comparative government institutions as solutions to this kind of agency problem, 
see Cooter (2000).  His more abstract treatment draws  out more implications; e.g., that if there is sufficiently high 
probability that mere bad luck will make bureaucratic behavior come to light, the politician will give him wider 
discretion ex ante (p. 86).  
 
29 Having the governor appoint the official does not completely solve the problem.  It remains the case that  those 
voters who are particularly affected by the official will be the ones whose vote for governor will turn on his 
appointment of that official. If the governor knows this,  his appointment will be influenced by the desire of the 
special interest.  Having the governor in between, however, hinders the special interest from making so easy use of 
its votes, because it must obtain access to the governor, who is busy with a great many lobbying requests,  to let him 
know of their interest in that official.    
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ballot box, none of them is as accountable   as when only one official is up for a vote.   It is 
simply too costly for voters to keep track of all the officials, and so they delegate their authority 
to one, and keep a close watch on him.  It is like the response to the proverb that your should not 
put all your eggs in one basket: that you should indeed put all your eggs in one basket--- and 
watch that basket.  
This discussion of electing bureaucrats may  seem too theoretical, far from the practice of 
any real-world country.  American readers, though, will realize that it is not. A federalist system 
such as that of the United States does not usually have voters electing both an executive and his 
subordinates (though there  usually are  separate elections for governor and for other high state 
officials such as the secretary of state and attorney-general).  It does, however, have multiple 
hierarchies.  Many Americans will vote for a president of the country, a governor of the state, a 
commissioner of the county, and a mayor of the city in which he lives  Some services, such as 
crime prevention and detection, will be provided at all four levels.   Others will not— it can 
happen that only the country runs the army, only the state runs universities, only the county runs 
the library, and only the city runs liquor licensing—but the voter must keep track of the talents of 
four executives, not to mention the four legislative bodies associated with them. The reason is no 
doubt   connected to the one standardly given: that different localities want different services, 
and so liquor licensing in Bloomington is unbundled from liquor licensing in Cambridge.  But 
this logic does not explain Japan, where school textbooks are an issue for the prime minister,
30  
nor does it explain  why other countries besides Japan and the United States have even more 
centralized and bundled governments.  Indeed, viewing just the Japanese case, one might explain 
the bundling there as the result of regional differences too: if majority voters think that majorities 
in atypical localities such as left-wing Kyoto would use federalism to promote atypical policies 
there,  they would vote against regional unbundling.  And, in any case, we are left wondering 
why centrally elected officials could not administer heterogenous local rules, instead of having to 
elect local officials for local rules.  The question of which bureaucrats are bundled is both 
practical and interesting—but too hard for us to fully address here. 
31 
 
One detail of the puzzle remains.  We have seen that it is useful for politicians to be able 
to discipline bureaucrats, and that as in private corporations, politicians make use of hierarchies 
to monitor their subordinates.  In private corporations, however, the board of directors allows the 
chief executive to fire his subordinates at will. Why, then, do governments use civil service 
systems in which firing is difficult even if promotions and transfers can still be used for 
discipline?  
The answer is not the conventional one that a civil service system eliminates political 
influence on the bureaucracy.   It does not, since politicians can still intervene directly to change 
decisions and can still affect personnel policy, even if they cannot take away a bureaucrat’s 
salary.  And as we have explained, eliminating political influence would be undesirable,  because 
it would prevent the officials elected by the voters from delivering the policies the voters want. 
                                                           
30 China and South Korea objected to the treatment of prewar Japanese wrongs in the textbooks approved for 
Japanese schools and this  became a national Japanese issue. See, for example, Kiroku Hannai, “Textbook Criticism 
Right on Target,” The Japan Times Online,  June 25, 2001, http://www,japantimes.co.jp (viewed July 20, 2001).   
31 The classic work on federalism from a public choice perspective is William Riker’s 1964 book, Federalism:  
Origins, Operation, Significance. For a more recent treatment by a leading economist, see Chapters 5 and 6 of 
Cooter’s 2000 book, The Strategic Constitution.   It is clear that sometimes it is desirable to have local regulations 
because local conditions differ.    The harder  question that is why a central government administering 
heterogeneous local rules is not better than a variety of local governments.    
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Rather, the usefulness of the civil service system is that it forces the politicians to use the 
bureaucracy solely as a means of delivering services rather than  as a  way to reward supporters. 
This is particularly important because giving supporters jobs is generally an inefficient way to 
channel wealth to them. Someone who wants a reward for political support is unlikely to have 
the talents and skills appropriate to the bureaucratic post that available. A ward chairman may be 
fine as a general manager, but the bureaucracy needs accountants and computer programmers 
too.   The politicians will not put incompetents in all the posts, since they must deliver services to 
voters as well as please special supporters, but the presence of political deadwood will degrade 
the quality of services and raise their cost.   Also, if political changes lead  to turnover in jobs 
(admittedly, more of a problem in an alternating-party regime like the US than in a single-party 
regime like Japan),  the politically appointed bureaucrats will never learn the jobs properly and 
will perpetually be in end-periods, untrustworthy because they expect to be moving on soon 
anyway.  Thus it makes sense for voters to support politicians who agree to install a civil service 
system to restrict the amount of employment patronage available.  And in an alternating-party 
regime, the politicians might favor a  civil service even without voter pressure, because they 
know it is costly in terms of efficiency and it benefits the other party as much as themselves.  
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VI.  Conclusion 
Judicial independence is not primarily a matter of constitutional text.  Both the modern 
Japanese and the modern American constitutions purport to insulate judges from political 
leaders.  Yet modern American politicians insulate their judges, while Japanese politicians do 
not.  American politicians appoint party loyalists, but once they appoint them intervene no 
further.  Japanese politicians intervene regularly to ensure that their judges stay loyal.  American 
politicians could restructure their courts to enable them to intervene as Japanese politicians do.  
Notwithstanding, they do not. 
Instead, whether politicians intervene in the courts seems a function of electoral 
exigency.  Although both American and Japanese political leaders must compete in electoral 
markets, LDP leaders competed far more successfully than the leaders of either the Democratic 
or the Republican parties.  As a result, LDP leaders had better odds of retaining control.  Having 
better odds, they faced lower risk-adjusted costs to nonindependent judiciaries.  With lower 
costs, they opted for nonindependent judges and closely monitored their judicial agents. 
Independent courts represent a cooperative equilibrium to a game that closely resembles 
an indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.  As such, they represent one outcome -- but not a 
unique one.  In indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas, a wide range of outcomes can be 
equilibria.  Only if a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is about to end do the outcomes become more 
predictable.  Where one party expects to win elections consistently, it may well decide not to 
keep courts independent.  Where both parties expect the electoral market to end soon, they will 
not keep courts independent.  Landes and Posner nicely captured the electoral logic behind the 
American judicial system.  In doing so, however, they captured a special case -- a result peculiar 
to electoral markets where all parties perform erratically.  Here, we generalize the theory to a 
broader range of competitive electoral markets. 
The theory would seem to apply to bureaucrats as well as judges, yet bureaucrats lack 
independence in all three regimes that we consider, regardless of  the degree of interparty 
competition or the approach of an end period   We conclude that this is because  the benefits of 
independence—the enforcing of promises made by the politicians and the monitoring of 
bureaucrats—are  benefits that can be gained by making only a small number of government 
personnel independent, and the costs—reduced accountability to the electorate  in policy 
decisions and reduced incentives for quality effort—are lower for the tasks that judges perform.  
Potentially, the 50 American states present a more systematic test of the theory.  The 
various states maintain courts with a wide range of institutional independence.  In some states, 
politicians and voters keep close control over judicial careers; in others, they offer judges an 
independence akin to that of federal judges.  Over the past century, the fifty states have also 
presented electoral markets with a wide range of political variability.  In some states, one party 
maintained a lock on power for decades; elsewhere, the parties alternated regularly in office.  
The theory above suggests (a) that states with alternating parties may or may not maintain 
independent courts but (b) that states where one party regularly wins elections will be   less 
likely to maintain independent courts.    
We have not performed that systematic test.  Instead, we offer here a more modest 
argument -- one with three archetypal examples.  In the modern United States, neither party 
controls either the legislature or the presidency.  The parties maintain a strict hands-off-the-
courts rule.  In postwar Japan, one party dominated the electoral market.  It consistently offered 
nonindependent courts.  In prewar Japan, both parties knew that the military would likely usurp   
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government soon.  They too eventually offered nonindependent courts.  Despite most of what is 
taught in law schools, judicial independence has had less to do with constitutional texts.  It has 
had more to do with elections. 
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Excerpt  from CHAPTER V: THE DIET 
 
Article 64: 
The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purposes of trying 
those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted. 2) Matters relating to impeachment shall be 
provided for by law. 
 
CHAPTER VI: JUDICIARY 
 
Article 76: 
The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law. 2) No 
extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial 
power. 3) All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this 
Constitution and the laws. 
 
Article 77: 
The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of 
practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial 
affairs. 2) Public procurators shall be subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. 3) The Supreme Court 
may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts. 
 
Article 78: 
Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically 
incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive 
organ or agency. 
 
Article 79: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such 
judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the 
Cabinet. 2) The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general 
election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the 




The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme 
Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten(10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that 
they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law. 2) The judges of the inferior courts shall 
receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office. 
 
Article 81: 
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, 
regulation or official act. 
 
Article 82:   
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Trials shall be conducted and judgement declared publicly. 2) Where a court unanimously determines publicity to be 
dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses 
involving the press or cases wherein the rights of people as guaranteed in CHAPTER III of this Constitution are in 








CHAPTER V. THE JUDICATURE 
 
     Article 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor. 
     (2) The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law. 
 
     Article 58. The judges shall be appointed from among those  who possess proper qualifications according to law. 
     (2) No judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment. 
     (3) Rules for disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law. 
 
     Article 59. Trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear, 
that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial 
may be suspended by provisions of law or by the decision of the Court of Law. 
 
     Article 60. All matters that fall within the competency of a special Court, shall be specially provided for by law.  
 
     Article 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the 
administrative authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation 
specially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by Court of Law. 
 




UNITED STATES: 1789 CONSTITUTION 
 
 
Article I.  
Excerpt from Section 2:  




Excerpt from Section 3: 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath 
or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall 
be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 
 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall 




Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,   
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shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
 
Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a 
State and Citizens of another State [Modified by Amendment XI];--between Citizens of different States;--between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, 
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make. 
 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State 
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at 
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. 
 
Section. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their 
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two 
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. 
 
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work 
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. 
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